In 2022, we considered questions ranging from identifying the greatest weakness of the U.S. in the national security arena to considering how to de-center the U.S. in discussions, expand the array of perspectives, and bring together fresh solutions and new ideas.

To begin 2023, we want to explore the relationship between historical lessons and preparation for an unknown future. A wide array of thinkers have inspired this theme, including Lawrence Freedman. In The Future of War: A History, Freedman explains that the future is so difficult to predict because “it depends on choices that have yet to be made, including by our own governments, in circumstances that remain uncertain.” Freedman continues to unpack this notion, stating:

History is made by people who do not know what is going to happen next. Many developments that were awaited, either fearfully or eagerly, never happened. Those things that did happen were sometimes seen to be inevitable in retrospect but they were rarely identified as inevitable in prospect.[1]

For 1Q23, we want to hear your perspectives on the most useful point Strategy Bridge readers should consider regarding preparation for future warfare based on historical lessons, learned or not. How have states and other actors envisioned future warfare? How did they prepare, or fail to prepare, for their future warfare? Are these lessons of use to states and other actors as they prepare for future conflict?

Submissions should conform to our submission guidelines. They should be concisely written, 1000-2000 words in length (excluding citations), and must include appropriate footnotes formatted consistent with the Chicago Manual of Style.

Submissions should be scoped narrowly enough to make a complete and meaningful argument that is backed up by evidence. All submissions must be received no later than 9 January 2023. Those submissions selected for publication will be published beginning in early March 2023. We highly encourage writers to download our submissions template to save you time and to ensure that your submission comports with our editorial requirements.

We know our community of readers, thinkers, and writers will have ideas to add to this conversation.

We can’t wait to read your writing!

Notes:

[1] H. R. McMaster, Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New York, NY: Harper, 2020), 15–16, 127–33.

[2] McMaster, 16.

[3] U.S. Congress. Senate, Statement of Admiral John C. Aquilino, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Indo-Pacific Command Posture, Senate, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., March 22, 2022, 2.

[4] Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate (New York: Random House, 2013), xviii.

[5] Lt. Gen. Kevin B. Schneider, “Remarks to the Japan National Press Club” (Tokyo, February 25, 2020), usfj.mil.

[6] Seth Robson, “Russia Deploys Bastion Anti-Ship Missile System to Island North of Japan,” Stars and Stripes, December 7, 2021; Jon Grevatt et al., “Update: Russia Deploys Bastion Coastal Defence System at New Military Facility in Disputed Kuril Islands,” Janes.com, December 7, 2021.

[7] Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 56–58.

[8] “Historian Addresses Wesleyan,” The New York Times, June 4, 1984, Late edition, sec. B, timemachine.nytimes.com.

[9] Doshi, The Long Game, 271–76; Brands and Beckley, Danger Zone, 27–28. Brands and Beckley note, “During the Century of Humiliation, China was forced to fight more than a dozen wars on its soil and suffered two of the deadliest civil wars in history: the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864, 20-30 million dead) and the Chinese Civil War (1927-1948, 7-8 million dead).”

[10] Timothy Webster, “A Formula to Resolve the South Korea-Japan Wartime Forced Labor Issue,” United States Institute of Peace, August 18, 2022, https://www.usip.org.

[11] For an executive synopsis of China’ Three Warfares, see Seth G. Jones, Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran, and the Rise of Irregular Warfare, First edition (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2021), 147–49.

[12] Regarding China, Australia’s former Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, explains Xi Jinping’s world view using a heuristic of ten concentric circles, the first of which is Xi’s and CCP’s determination to remain in power. See, Kevin Rudd, The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and XI Jinping’s China (New York: PublicAffairs, 2022), 77–94.

[13] See Freedom House’s 2022 report for regional and country-specific assessments of tools authoritarian leaders use to maintain internal control. Brands and Beckley, Danger Zone, 49–51; Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz, “Freedom in the World 2022, The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule” (Freedom House, February 2022), https://freedomhouse.org.

[14] Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “Russia Halts WWII Peace Treaty Talks with Japan in Response to Sanctions over Ukraine Invasion,” Washington Post, March 22, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/.

[15] Council on Foreign Relations, “North Korea’s Military Capabilities,” Backgrounder, June 28, 2022, https://www.cfr.org.

Notes:

[1] President Vladmir Putin, National Security of the Russian Federation (Russian Federation, 2021), 3, 17.

[2] President Joseph R Biden Jr, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (The White House, 2021), 6, 8 , 14.

[3] President Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The White House, 2017), 25.

[4] Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History, 2nd edition (Abingdon, UK : New York: Routledge, 2011), 191.

[5] The JP 3-0 uses the conflict continuum to describe the range of military operations from peacetime to wartime activities. The JDN 1-19 reorients the conflict continuum war and peace scale into a world neither at peace nor at war, “the competition continuum describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.” The Atlantic Council report expands the JDN 1-19 competition continuum concept further by adding specified enemy actions while proposing a U.S. strategy to counter adversary advantages throughout the continuum. DoD, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (Washington, DC: US GPO, 2018), V–4; DoD, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum (Washington, DC: US GPO, 2019); Clementine G. Starling, Tyson Wetzel, and Christian Trottie, “Seizing the Advantage: A Vision for the next US National Defense Strategy” (Atlantic Council, December 22, 2021), 31–46, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/seizing-the-advantage-a-vision-for-the-next-us-national-defense-strategy/.

[6] Colin S. Gray, “Comparative Strategic Culture,” Parameters 14, no. 4 (1984): 27; Ken Booth, “The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed,” in Strategic Power: United States of America and the USSR, ed. Carl G Jacobsen (Springer, 1990), 121; John Street, “Political Culture – From Civic Culture to Mass Culture,” British Journal of Political Science 24, no. 1 (1994): 96; Frederick C. Turner, “Reassessing Political Culture,” in Latin America In Comparative Perspective: New Approaches To Methods And Analysis, ed. Peter H. Smith (Boulder: Routledge, 1995), 195; Jeffrey S Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” in Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Springer, 2009), 34.

[7] John S. Duffield et al., “Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies,” International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 156–80; John S. Duffield, “Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism,” International Organization 53, no. 4 (ed 1999): 768–69; John Glenn, “Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?,” International Studies Review 11, no. 3 (2009): 523, 530, 545.

[8] For additional information on the evolution of political and strategic culture, respectively, see Camelia Florela Voinea, “Political Culture Research: Dilemmas and Trends. Prologue to the Special Issue,” Quality & Quantity 54, no. 2 (April 1, 2020): 361–82; Anand V., “Revisiting the Discourse on Strategic Culture: An Assessment of the Conceptual Debates,” Strategic Analysis 44, no. 3 (May 3, 2020): 193–207.

[9] Michael C Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” International Security 23, no. 1 (1998): 150–52; Duffield, “Political Culture and State Behavior,” 773–74; Colin S. Gray, “Out of the Wilderness: Prime-Time for Strategic Culture” (Washington, D.C: U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, July 2006), ii, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA521640; Antulio J. Echevarria, “Strategic Culture: More Problems Than Prospects,” Infinity Journal 3, no. 2 (2013): 41; V., “Revisiting the Discourse on Strategic Culture,” 193; Antulio J. Echevarria, “Colin Gray and The Paradox of Strategic Culture: Critical but Unknowable,” Comparative Strategy 40, no. 2 (March 4, 2021): 174.

[10] Colin S. Gray, “Strategy and Culture,” in Strategy in Asia: The Past, Present, and Future of Regional Security, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken and Dan Blumenthal, 1st edition (Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2014), 92–93.

[11] Echevarria, “Colin Gray and the Paradox of Strategic Culture,” 175.

[12] Snyder’s strategic culture definition was tailored toward nuclear strategy. However, removing that portion of Snyder’s description does not detract from his assessment of strategic culture’s consistency. Jack L. Snyder, “The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations” (RAND Corporation, January 1, 1977), 8.

[13] Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Cornell University Press, 1996), 17.

[14] Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2.

[15] Gray, 22.

[16] Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, Md.: Madison Books, 1986), 35–39; Booth, “The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed,” 126; Eric Herring, “Nuclear Totem and Taboo: Or How We Learned to Stop Loving the Bomb and Start Worrying,” 1997, 11.

[17] Colin S. Gray, “Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture,” in Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking, ed. Kerry M. Kartchner, Jeannie L. Johnson, and Jeffrey A. Larsen (Springer, 2009), 223–27.

[18] Gray, 227, 231.

[19] Strategic culture is a non-linear ecosystem that typically evolves slowly. However, since each antecedent is modulated by some variable, the significance or impact of that variable could dramatically revise the output of a nation’s strategic culture.

[20] The JP 3-0 uses the conflict continuum to describe the range of military operations from peacetime to wartime activities. The JDN 1-19 reorients the conflict continuum war and peace scale into a world neither at peace nor at war, “the competition continuum describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.” The Atlantic Council report expands the JDN 1-19 competition continuum concept further by adding specified enemy actions while proposing a U.S. strategy to counter adversary advantages throughout the continuum. DoD, JP 3-0: Joint Operations, V–4; DoD, JDN 1-19: Competition Continuum; Starling, Wetzel, and Trottie, “Seizing the Advantage,” 31–46.

[21] Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

[22] Clausewitz, 104.

[23] Clausewitz, 119.

[24] The Egyptians did not have a word for “war” or “peace.” Instead, they referred to “war” as “campaign, battle, or army, while “peace” equated to “quietness, satisfaction, or mercy.” Susanne Bickel, “Concepts of Peace in Ancient Egypt,” in Peace in the Ancient World: Concepts and Theories, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub (John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 48–49, 54–55.

[25] Johannes Bronkhorst, “Thinking about Peace in Ancient India,” in Peace in the Ancient World: Concepts and Theories, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub (John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 87–88.

[26] Robin D. S. Yates, “Searching for Peace in the Warring States: Philosophical Debates and the Management of Violence in Early China,” in Peace in the Ancient World: Concepts and Theories, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub (John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 108.

[27] Yates, 112.

[28] Sun Tzu, The Illustrated Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, The Definitive English Translation by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 91.

[29] Kurt A. Raaflaub, “Greek Concepts and Theories of Peace,” in Peace in the Ancient World: Concepts and Theories, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub (John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 126.

[30] Raaflaub, 130, 142–44.

[31] Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century CE to the Third (JHU Press, 2016), 2.

[32] Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire (Harvard University Press, 2011), 58.

[33] Clausewitz conceded this point as well, stating “the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.” Clausewitz, On War, 80.

[34] Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, 257.

[35] Tzu, The Illustrated Art of War, 115; Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed (New York, N.Y., U.S.A: Meridian, 1991), 5, 324–27.

[36] Liddell Hart, Strategy, 322.

[37] Liddell Hart, 322.

[38] Tzu, The Illustrated Art of War, 115.

[39] Tzu, 106; Liddell Hart, Strategy, 338; Clausewitz, On War, 96.

[40] Liddell Hart, Strategy, 352.

[41] Stephen Possony, “A Century of Conflict: Communist Techniques of World Revolution,” in The Communist Conspiracy: Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, by United States Congress. House Committee on Un-American Activities, vol. 1 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 19; Jacob W. Kipp, “The Other Side of the Hill: Soviet Military Foresight and Forecasting,” in Soviet Strategy and The New Military Thinking, ed. Derek Leebaert and Timothy Dickinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 250–51.

[42] Possony, “A Century of Conflict: Communist Techniques of World Revolution,” 20.

[43] Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1951), 31.

[44] Leites, 76.

[45] Ofer Fridman, Russian Hybrid Warfare Resurgence & Policisation, eBook (London, 2018), chap. 2.

[46] Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today (Penguin, 2006), 13–15.

[47] Fridman, Russian Hybrid Warfare Resurgence & Policisation, 64.

[48] Maine, Sir H. J. S. 1888. International Law: A Series of Lectures Delivered before the University of Cambridge. Cambridge, 8; Quoted in: Hans Van Wees, “Broadening the Scope: Thinking about Peace in the Pre-Modern World,” in Peace in the Ancient World: Concepts and Theories, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub (John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 158.

[49] Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order (Yale University Press, 2000), 29–31.

[50] In their landmark The Puzzle of Peace, Goertz et al. analyzed six indicators to construct a framework measuring positive-peace relationships. The number, prominence, and degree to which states handle disputed issues determine placement along the continuum, with “severe rivals” and “security cooperation relationships” serving as the poles. The four interrelated characteristics were: 1) absence of major territorial claims, 2) institutions for conflict management, 3) high levels of functional interdependence, and 4) satisfaction with the status quo. In severe rivalry relationships, each state views the other as an enemy or competitor, leading to an extent threat of war, and driving both to prepare for its occurrence. In contrast to rivalries, negative peace is somewhat of a no-man’s land. Within this category, relationships may take on the appearance of rivalries or friendships. The absence of major territorial claims, the establishment of institutions for conflict management, high levels of functional interdependence, and satisfaction with the status quo characterize the “positive peace zone.” In this relationship, war or the use of military force between members is unthinkable or has a zero probability of occurring. Gary Goertz, Paul F. Diehl, and Alexandru Balas, The Puzzle of Peace: The Evolution of Peace in the International System, 1st edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[51] President Harry S Truman, Inaugural Address of Harry S. Truman (Washington, D.C.: Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, 1949), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/truman.asp.

[52] Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security (Simon and Schuster, 2018), 43.

[53] Mariya Zheleznova and Nikolay Epple. 2016. “Pens of the Motherland: Why High-Ranking Officials Are Fighting the United States in the Russian Media.” Vedemosti. April 18, 2016. Quoted in: Graeme P. Herd, Understanding Russian Strategic Behavior: Imperial Strategic Culture and Putin’s Operational Code (London: Routledge, 2022), 98.

[54] Biden Jr, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, 6, 11, 13, 16–17, 20; Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17, 22, 31, 40–41, 46; President Barack H. Obama, National Security Strategy (The White House, 2015), i–ii, 15.

[55] Dexter Perkins, “The Moralistic Interpretation of American Foreign Policy,” in A Reader in American Foreign Policy, by James M. McCormick (Itasca, IL: Peacock, 1986), 21.

[56] James M. McCormick, “Diplomatic History,” in Routledge Handbook of American Foreign Policy, ed. Steven W. Hook and Christopher M. Jones, 1st edition (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 22.

[57] Putin, National Security of the Russian Federation, para. 19.

[58] Keir Giles, Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West (Washington, D.C.; London: Brookings Inst. Press/Chatham House, 2019), 109.

[59] Giles, 112.

[60] Ashish Kumar Sen, “Mr. Putin’s Lies Hiding in Plain Sight,” Atlantic Council (blog), May 28, 2015, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/mr-putin-s-lies-hiding-in-plain-sight/.

[61] Christopher Bort, “Why The Kremlin Lies: Understanding Its Loose Relationship With the Truth,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed February 1, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/01/06/why-kremlin-lies-understanding-its-loose-relationship-with-truth-pub-86132.

[62] Nicolai N. Petro, “Russia’s Moral Framework and Why It Matters,” The National Interest (The Center for the National Interest, September 24, 2015), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia%E2%80%99s-moral-framework-why-it-matters-13923.

[63] Ofer Fridman, “The Russian Mindset and War: Between Westernizing the East and Easternizing the West,” in Special Issue on Strategic Culture, ed. Jeannie Johnson (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2022), 31.

[64] “By Enlarging NATO, West ‘Spat Upon’ Russia’s Interests Despite Good Relations, Putin Says,” TASS, June 9, 2021.

[65] U.S. White House, “Fact Sheet: President Bush’s Accomplishments in 2005,” accessed November 2, 2021, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051222-2.html.

[66] Herd, Understanding Russian Strategic Behavior, 58; Miroław Minkina and Malina Kaszuba, “Color Revolutions as a Threat to Security of the Ressian Federation: The Analysis of Russian Perspective,” Torun International Studies 1, no. 14 (2021): 80.

[67] “Putin Warns of ‘quick and Tough’ Response to Any Provocation by the West,” France 24, April 21, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20210421-putin-warns-of-quick-and-tough-response-to-any-provocation-by-the-west.

[68] Oscar Jonsson, The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines Between War and Peace, 2019, 2.

[69] Volodymyr Yermolenko, “The New Russian Attack on Ukraine: Is It Real?,” Explaining Ukraine, accessed December 15, 2021, https://soundcloud.com/user-579586558/ep-58.

[70] Stalin, Joseph, Sochineniya, Institut Marksa-Engelsa-Lenina pri TsK VKP(b), Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literaturi, Moscow, 1948, 167-168. Quoted in: Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo, 85; Jonsson, The Russian Understanding of War, 41.

[71] Mark Galeotti, “Controlling Chaos: How Russia Manages Its Political War in Europe,” European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR), September 1, 2017, 8–10; Michael Kofman, “A Comparative Guide to Russia’s Use of Force: Measure Twice, Invade Once,” War on the Rocks, February 16, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/a-comparative-guide-to-russias-use-of-force-measure-twice-invade-once/.

[72] Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, 58.

[73] Paul F. Diehl, “Exploring Peace: Looking Beyond War and Negative Peace,” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 1.

[74] Goertz, Diehl, and Balas, The Puzzle of Peace, 36; Herbert Kelman, “Transforming the Relationship Between Former Enemies: A Social-Psychological Analysis,” in After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation, ed. Robert L. Rothstein (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 197; Benjamin Miller, “Hot Wars, Cold Peace,” in War in a Changing World, ed. Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 100.

[75] According to the Hobbesian world view, great-power states are the “guardians” or “custodians” of the international order and maintain powerful militaries. Similar to the concept of “suzerainty,” guardian powers limit the external sovereignty of non-incorporated states in their empire or alliance while allowing “almost complete” autonomy in internal matters. In a Hobbesian world, all states are sovereign; some are just more sovereign than others. Additionally, Bull argues that great powers are recognized as such and have the right to help determine the international system’s peace and security issues. Moreover, great powers preserve the international order’s balance by preventing the emergence of a hegemon. In the Hobbesian tradition, states, especially great powers, are unencumbered by moral or legal restrictions while pursing goals and interests. Hedley Bull, Andrew Hurrell, and Stanley Hoffman, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 4th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 17, 24, 97, 195–96, 201; E. Wayne Merry, “The Origins of Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Clash of Russian and European ‘Civilizational Choices’ for Ukraine,” in Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine, ed. Elizabeth Wood et al. (Washington, D.C; New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press / Columbia University Press, 2015), 28–31.

[76] Hobbes saw humankind’s existence as “poor, nasty, [and] brutish,” people must divest their liberties to a sovereign authority to “prevent Discord and Civil War.” Hobbes viewed the world as being in a perpetual state of war, stating, “during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man.” Thomas Hobbes, Hobbes: Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck, 2nd Revised Student Edition (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 88-89, 125.

[77] David R. Jones, “Soviet Strategic Culture,” in Strategic Power: United States of America and the USSR, ed. Carl G Jacobsen (Springer, 1990), 35.

[78] Marlene Laruelle, Russian Nationalism, Foreign Policy and Identity Debates in Putin’s Russia: New Ideological Patterns after the Orange Revolution (Columbia University Press, 2014), 7–8.

[79] For a more thorough reading on Locke’s views on the social contract, see John Locke, Locke: Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett, Student Edition (Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 271, 287–88, 336, 344, 362, 384–85.

[80] William R. Emerson, “American Concepts of Peace and War,” Naval War College Review 10, no. 9 (1958): 3.

[81] Theo Farrell, “Strategic Culture and American Empire,” The SAIS Review of International Affairs 25, no. 2 (2005): 5, 12; Colin Dueck, “Hegemony on the Cheap: Liberal Internationalism from Wilson to Bush,” World Policy Journal 20, no. 4 (2003): 1–11; Thomas G. Mahnken, “United States Strategic Culture,” in Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum Project: Assessing Strategic Culture as a Methodological Approach to Understanding WMD Decision-Making by States and Non-State Actors, ed. Jeffrey A. Larsen (McLean, VA: Science Application International Corporation, 2006), 6–7, 9, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA521640.

[82] Mahnken, “United States Strategic Culture,” 6; Dominic Tierney, “How We Fight: Crusades, Quagmires, and the American Way of War – Foreign Policy Research Institute,” November 6, 2010, chap. 1.

[83] Clausewitz, On War, 69, 87; Joseph Caldwell Wylie Jr, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Naval Institute Press, 2014), chap. 7; The Principles of Strategy for An Independent Corps or Army in a Theater of Operations (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School Press, 1936).

[84] Emerson, “American Concepts of Peace and War,” 5.

[85] Michael J Boyle and Anthony F Lang Jr, “Remaking the World in America’s Image: Surprise, Strategic Culture, and the American Ways of Intervention,” Foreign Policy Analysis 17, no. 2 (2021): 1.

[86] Boyle and Lang Jr, 1–7.

[87] Farrell, “Strategic Culture and American Empire,” 5.

[88] Reşat Bayer, “Peaceful Transitions and Democracy,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (September 1, 2010): 542.

[89] Bayer, 542.

[90] Colin S. Gray, Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy (Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, 2009), 58.

[91] Depending on where a reader pulls Clausewitz’s “continuation of policy” quote from On War, a reader will see “policy by other means” or “policy with other means.” Clausewitz, On War, 69, 87; James R. Holmes, “Everything You Know About Clausewitz Is Wrong,” accessed November 4, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/everything-you-know-about-clausewitz-is-wrong/.

[92] Clausewitz, On War, 153.

[93] David Kilcullen, “Strategic Culture,” in The Culture of Military Organizations, ed. Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 51–52.

[94] Hon. William M. Thornberry et al., “The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare and Key Challenges,” Statement before the House Armed Services Committee 22 (2017): 5.

[95] Clausewitz, On War, 75, 184.

[96] Gray, “Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture,” 231.

[97] Colin S. Gray, “British and American Strategic Cultures” (Paper prepared for the symposium, Democracies in Partnership: 400 Years of Transatlantic Engagement, Williamsburg, VA, April 18, 2007), 7; Jeannie L. Johnson, The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture: Lessons Learned and Lost in America’s Wars (Georgetown University Press, 2018), 17.

[98] Gray, “Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture,” 231.

[99] Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” 44–45; Heiko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich, and Alexandra Jonas, eds., Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent, vol. 13 (Potsdam, Germany: Springer VS, 2013), 12–13; Gray, “Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture,” 232, 236.

[100] In the American case, examples include, but are not limited to: WWI, WW2, the Berlin Airlift, Korean War, Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, Operation Restore Hope, September 11th, 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In the Russian case, examples include, but are not limited to: WW1, the Bolshevik Revolution, WW2, the Berlin blockade, Cuban Missile Crisis, Afghanistan, fall of the Soviet Union, Chechnyan Wars, Color Revolutions, Russo-Georgia conflict, supporting Assad regime in Syria, Annexation of Crimea, and current Russo-Ukrainian War. Kerry M. Kartchner, Jeannie L. Johnson, and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds., “Introduction,” in Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking (Springer, 2009), 6.

[101] Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” 45.

[102] Johnson, The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture, 16.

[103] Lloyd J. Austin III, Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022), https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF.

[104] Jeannie L. Johnson, “Conclusion: Toward a Standard Methodolical Approach,” in Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking, ed. Kerry M. Kartchner, Jeannie L. Johnson, and Jeffrey A. Larsen (Springer, 2009), 244.

[105] Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword, Revised edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 23, 35.

Sub-objective 1: Strengthen Bilateral Relationships with the SCS Five. The DoS will lead the diplomatic efforts to conduct and manage bilateral relationships with each of the governments of the SCS Five. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) will provide trade support. The Department of Defense (DoD), USAID, and the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC) will support DoS diplomatic initiatives with expertise and offerings in their respective areas of operation. The support efforts would include membership in state delegations, trade, foreign aid, humanitarian support, Rule of Law, and other pertinent areas necessary to bolster U.S. goodwill. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Intelligence Community (IC) will provide the Intelligence and Information support required to facilitate successful diplomatic relations and international support. IC support mechanisms include human intelligence, signal intelligence, and cyber-intelligence that would give the U.S. an advantage. IC information support mechanisms include operations and sharing relationships that encourage the SCS Five to embrace and welcome close diplomatic, trade, and military relationships.

Sub-objective 2: Strengthen Multilateral Relations with ASEAN. The DoS will also lead the way in conducting and managing multilateral relationships with ASEAN and its member states. In addition to the support outlined in Sub-objective 1 above from the DoD, USAID, DFC, and IC, the office of the UN Ambassador will also support this multilateral diplomatic effort to facilitate successful diplomatic relations and international support.

Objective 2: Free The Sea. The U.S. will deter China’s illegal enforcement of unfounded claims without provoking military conflict and deny the fait accompli of coercing maritime concessions from the SCS Five.

Sub-objective 1: Deter Chinese Escalation and Deny Coercion Opportunities. The DoD will show U.S. commitment and might by maintaining its readiness and deployments supporting existing defense agreements. The U.S. counters China’s coercive use of its naval assets against the SCS Five and deters Chinese expansion by conducting routine freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the SCS. The U.S. also engages in military exercises with its partner nations. U.S. defense treaties with the Philippines and Thailand and the U.S. partnership with Australia justify U.S. military presence. There is no need to change this mode of operation, which serves as a deterrent to further Chinese expansion.

Sub-objective 2: Secure Information- and Cyber-Space. The IC and the U.S. Military will lead the efforts to secure the cyber domain. There will be an increased need for information operations to counter Chinese propaganda and misinformation regarding U.S. military activity, especially in advance of “Save the SEA” implementation operations. The U.S. must be wary to prevent portrayal as imperialistic, hidden agenda-driven opportunists to the SCS Five. The IC must upgrade cyber measures to prevent sabotage of “Free The Sea” and “Save the SEA” operations. The IC must proactively gather and process intelligence to stay ahead of hostile Chinese information and cyber-attacks well before the start of the “Save The SEA” operations. The information should be shared as needed with USAID, USTR, DoS, and the USACE to shape the development of technology and operational schemes for “Save the SEA” implementation, including working with local governments to tailor the information and messaging.

Objective 3: Save the SEA—NOAA’s ARC. The U.S. will develop and deploy coastal adaptation programs to the SCS Five.

Sub-objective 1: Develop Feasible Coastal Adaptation Measures for the SCS Five. NOAA will lead the ARC’s technological effort to ascertain SCS Five needs and facilitate the development of feasible coastal adaptation measures. The ARC will include the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the DFC, and the DoS. The USACE will provide technological and personnel support similar to the DoD support of NASA during the 1960s space program. The DFC will lead the mobilization and facilitation of U.S. private sector support. The DoS will leverage U.S. relationships with international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation to facilitate the internationalization of the support effort.

Sub-objective 2: Secure Agreements For Coastal Adaptation Support To The SCS Five. With USAID support, the DoS will lead the effort to provide aid to the SCS Five, offering coastal adaptation ARC support for areas bordering the SCS. As part of ARC efforts, the DFC and the DoS will facilitate the involvement of international organizations and the private sector to provide the infrastructure and workforce for the projects. The military will provide security, and the IC will provide intelligence and information support to facilitate the closing of the respective agreements.

Sub-objective 3: Manage And Execute SCS Five Coastal Adaptation Measures. USAID will oversee the projects, and NOAA will provide operational oversight over ARC construction of the coastal adaptation projects. As part of ARC efforts, the DFC and international partner organizations will facilitate the involvement of the public and private sectors, emphasizing using local talent for the respective projects to provide an ancillary economic benefit. USAID will also provide legal oversight support to American entities to prevent corruption and misuse of aid funding and resources. The DoD will adjust its ongoing operational effort to afford security as an ancillary benefit to the operating theater. The IC will provide information and intelligence support, including cyber support, to prevent sabotage from hostile actors. The DoS will provide diplomatic support for the effort by coalition-building with international partners and serving as the liaison between the U.S., the SCS Five, and ASEAN.

Constraints

There are several constraints: (i) Governmental: The U.S. Congress may not support or grant sufficient funding for the initiative, (ii) Domestic: the U.S. Congress or public may not support SEA-Merica 2040, (iii) International: Opponents may portray the U.S. as imperialistic, (iv) media-driven polarization: the initiative may be attacked from within and become a subject of political polarization. Support must be bi-partisan to be sustainable.

First, this diplomatic effort must have support from the Presidential level. As seen in the 2000 and 2016 elections, administration changes can stop diplomatic efforts in their tracks. DoS must conduct the diplomatic effort in a way that garners bipartisan support to ensure stability and sustainability. Information channels, including the media, must be utilized to shape and obtain the political and public support necessary to avoid the politicization of the diplomatic effort.

Second, China may exhibit a thin skin when viewing increased U.S. diplomatic activity and retaliate with a “Wolf Warrior” response to intimidate ASEAN member states and the SCS Five. China will also likely employ misinformation and aggressive cyber-campaigns to portray the U.S. as insincere, disingenuous, and imperialistic. Information and Intelligence actors must be proactive in shaping the narrative to mitigate Chinese misinformation. Diplomatic, Economic, and Financial actors can also have trade and financial alternatives ready for the SCS Five, which would blunt any Chinese threats and deter China from bullying a regional trade partner exclusively into the U.S. orbit.

SEA-Merica 2040 Costs, Benefits, and Risks

Costs

SEA-Merica 2040 leverages existing missions and funding in the diplomatic and military arena for “Treat Friends Like Family” and “Free The Sea.” But the research and development effort will require additional funding for the assessment, development, and deployment of the technological needs for “Save The SEA.”

“Save The SEA” requires further development of existing coastal adaptation technology into deployable projects permanently maintainable by the host nation.[45] The DoD and USACE will require funds and resources to assess each host nation’s needs adequately and thoroughly. The DFC will then require the resources to mobilize and involve the private sector in developing the necessary technology, including both “hard” and “soft” coastal adaptation measures to afford the versatility of courses of action. USAID will require increased resources and budget to manage the implementation and construction phase and afford proper oversight to guard against corruption. IC resources must prevent hostile cyber-attacks, sabotage, and misinformation campaigns.

Benefits

The benefits of SEA-Merica 2040 outweigh the costs. “Save the SEA” completes the foundation for a peaceful strategy to deny China dominance through coercion of the SCS Five. In the same way that the Marshall Plan cemented Europe’s confidence in the U.S., “Save the SEA” will engender SCS Five goodwill and trust in the commitment and resolve of the U.S. by showing concern for the future of Southeast Asia in the face of impending climate change losses. Presenting a sustainable option to stave off the effects of climate change preserves the economic viability of the SCS Five benefits the U.S. by stabilizing the region. “Save the SEA” denies China the opportunity to capitalize on climate change, hindering its domination of the SCS. The investment benefits are a stable, free, and open SCS, increased regional resilience, climate change advances, and enhanced U.S. international standing – benefits well worth the investment.

Risks To SEA-Merica 2040

There are three key risks to SEA-Merica 2040: (i) lack of U.S. political support, (ii) failure to develop adequate technology, and (iii) SCS Five rejection of U.S. overtures.

First, political polarization and xenophobia may generate political opposition to SEA-Merica 2040 initiatives. Save The SEA and NOAA’s ARC should be presented to the Bipartisan Senate Climate Solutions Caucus to forestall opposition. The Caucus, with an equal number of Republican and Democratic members, is dedicated to crafting and advancing bipartisan solutions to address climate change needs.[46] Tying in climate change with U.S. national security interests would help enhance congressional level support. A robust information campaign highlighting the importance of free and open seas to the targeted leaders and the American population mitigates this risk. So will the embedding of projects within programs and schemes already funded and not rising to the treaty level where Senate ratification is required.

Second, the technology for feasible, sustainable, deployable coastal adaptation packages may come slow or reach a dead end. A thorough assessment of each host nation’s customized needs mitigates this risk. Maximum leverage of the U.S. private sector (and international private sector via the International Finance Corporation) to conduct the research and development spreads the cost and internationalizes the effort.

Third, the SCS Five may be hesitant to accept U.S. coastal adaptation support. The appointment of NOAA as the lead agency accomplishes the demilitarization of the U.S. effort. The internationalization of ARC presents the SCS Five with a joint scientific initiative rather than a predatory capitalistic effort (unlike the Belt-Road Initiative). The story of Noah and the Ark transcends societies and religions.[47] Thus, the branding of the NOAA team as the “ARC” communicates to the SCS Five the purpose: to remediate flooding from rising sea levels. The messaging cultivates trust from host nations, leading to confidence in the sincerity and effectiveness of U.S. coastal adaptation measures.

Risks From SEA-Merica 2040

There are three key risks from SEA-Merica 2040: (i) provocation of China, (ii) sabotage, and (iii) corruption.

First, China may feel threatened by U.S. peaceful overtures that influence the balance of power and, in retaliation, may engage in provocative military and economic action. Robust intelligence and information initiatives that allow the U.S. to calculate its moves and counter Chinese propaganda, misinformation, or military escalation mitigate this risk. Having a civilian agency such as NOAA lead the coastal adaptation effort also quells notions of militarization.

Second, China or other hostile nations might engage in acts of sabotage, including cyber-attacks and other nefarious means. China may also engage in corruption efforts or flood the area with projects to compete with or wall out SEA-Merica 2040. IC escalation of information and intelligence efforts to stay ahead of China and counter any propaganda, cyber-attack, misinformation, corruption, or pre-emptive commercial campaigns mitigates this risk.

Third, the private sector employment in the host nations, where the Rule of Law differs from the U.S., may result in corruption or mismanagement of “Save The SEA” assets. Providing resources to USAID for Inspector General audits from the outset of planning and throughout the process mitigates this risk. Unfortunately, after the “Save The SEA” projects are complete, Inspector General efforts may be less effective since the projects revert to the management of the host country. But deferring to the host nation to manage its affairs is the price of sovereignty and avoiding the appearance of U.S. imperialism.

Counter-Arguments

SEA-Merica 2040 stands up to criticism and alternatives. The most significant criticism is that the strategy is too expensive. Alternatively, detractors may deem SEA-Merica 2040 inferior to a head-to-head trade or military clash. Both arguments fail.

SEA-Merica 2040’s Benefits Outweigh The Costs

Since “Treat Friends Like Family” and “Free The Sea” use existing diplomatic and military funding, the only additional expense is developing and deploying versatile and sustainable coastal adaptation technology. “Save The SEA” is consistent with current national strategies and goals because coastal adaptation mitigation is an existing need. Senator Marco Rubio, a member of the Bipartisan Senate Climate Solutions Caucus, acknowledged the rise of sea level as a measurable fact against which the U.S. must mitigate and adapt.[48] With congressional support and Save the SEA’s nesting within both U.S. national security and imminent environmental needs, obtaining bipartisan executive and legislative branch support is realistic and achievable.

Regarding funding NOAA’s ARC and USAID for assessment, management, and deployment of coastal adaptation assets, the investment directly results in valuable goodwill and confidence in the U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia. This goodwill translates to influence and economic development in the region, thus increasing trade potential, cementing regional security, and effectively combating climate change. Peacefully leveraging climate change to gain a free and open sea and long-term U.S. influence is well worth the investment.

SEA-Merica 2040 Is The Most Achievable Approach

Direct trade or military competition involves behavior modification as an aim. China’s interest in the SCS is well-ingrained into its society as a national goal. China’s political will is too strong—no matter who the leader is, China will no sooner bend in its will for SCS domination than it would with Taiwan. A head-to-head trade battle would be costly. China’s economy is too strong to starve out—the Cold War tactics used against the Soviet Union will not work. A military war is too costly and risky for the U.S. The American public is not receptive to war.

A peaceful focus on mitigating climate change is consistent with international moods and U.S. domestic concerns. Elimination of coastal flooding is a bipartisan issue, benefitting the U.S., partner nations, and even China. Like the Moon landing program, SEA-Merica 2040 can unite the world by proactively addressing coastal adaptation, with the U.S. taking the lead.

Conclusion

China’s excessive maritime claims in the SCS destabilize and undermine the balance of power in Southeast Asia. The best way to achieve a free and open SCS is a peaceful strategy that nests the common needs of the SCS Five within U.S. security interests and capabilities, all without requiring modification of Chinese behavior for success. SEA-Merica 2040 does the job.