Notes:

[1] Seth Jones, Riley McCabe, and Alexander Palmer, ‘Ukrainian Innovation in a War of Attrition,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, 27 February 2023, accessed 30 March 2023, available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukrainian-innovation-war-attrition.

[2] Peter Dickinson, ‘2022 Review: Why Has Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine Invasion Gone Badly Wrong?”, Atlantic Council, 19 December 2022, accessed 29 March 2023, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/2022-review-why-has-vladimir-putins-ukraine-invasion-gone-so-badly-wrong/; Natasha Bertrand, Alex Marquardt, and Katie Bo Lillis, ‘The US and Its Allies Want Ukraine to Change its Battlefield Tactics in the Spring,’ CNN, 24 January 2023, accessed 29 March 2023, available at: https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/24/politics/ukraine-shift-tactics-bakhmut/index.html.

[3] Orlando Figes, The Story of Russia (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2022), 290-291.

[4] Candace Rondeaux, ‘Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare,’ New America, 5 November 2019, accessed 18 April 2023, available at: www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/decoding-wagner-group-analyzing-role-private-military-securitycontractors-russian-proxy-warfare/.

[5] Figes, The Story of Russia, 291-292.

[6] Altman, ‘By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion,’ 884.

[7] Amos Fox, “On Proxy War: A Multipurpose Tool for a Multipolar World,” Journal of Military Studies, Forthcoming: 10.

[8] Sean Case, ‘Putin’s Undeclared War: Summer 2014 – Russian Artillery Strikes Against Ukraine,’ Bellingcat, 21 December 2016, accessed 20 March 2023, available at: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2016/12/21/russian-artillery-strikes-against-ukraine/.

[9] Victoria Butenko, Laura Smith-Spark, and Diana Magnay, ‘US Official Says 1,000 Russian Troops Have Entered Ukraine,’ CNN, 29 August 2014, accessed 30 March 2023, available at: https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/index.html

[10] Mark Galeotti, Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2022), 316-318.

[11] Galeotti, Putin’s Wars, 316;Hughes, ‘Syria and the Perils of Proxy War,’ 523.

[12] Amos Fox, “On Proxy War,” Journal of Military Studies, (Forthcoming): 13-14.

[13] DPR is the Donetsk People’s Republic, which is the name given to the Russian controlled portion of Donetsk Oblast. LPR is the Luhansk People’s Republic, which is the name given to the Russian controlled portion of Luhansk oblast.

[14] Mark Galeotti, Pavel Baev, and Graeme Herd, ‘Militaries, Mercenaries, Militias, Morale, and the Ukraine War,’ George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, November 2022, accessed 18 March 2023, available at: https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/clock-tower-security-series/strategic-competition-seminar-series-fy23/militaries-mercenaries-militias-morale-and-ukraine-war.

[15] Galeotti, Baev, and Herd ‘Militaries, Mercenaries, Mercenaries, and Morale and the Ukraine War’.

[16] Galeotti, Baev, and Herd, ‘Militaries, Mercenaries, Militias, Morale, and the Ukraine War.’

[17] Mike Eckel, ‘Russia Proposes Major Military Reorganization, Conscription Changes, Increases Troop Numbers,’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 23 December 2022, accessed 30 March 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-military-reorganization-expansion/32190811.html.

[18] Alexander Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis, MN. East View Information Services, 1991), 246.

[19] Svechin, Strategy, 247.

[20] Kateryna Stepanenko and Karolina Hird, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 18, (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2022).

[21] Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Marc Santora, and Natalia Yermak, ‘Tens of Thousands of Civilians Are Now Largely Stranded in the Middle of One of the War’s Deadliest Battles,’ New York Times, 16 June 2022, accessed 30 March 2023, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/16/world/europe/sievierodonetsk-ukraine-civilians-stranded.html.

[22] Andrew Meldrum, ‘Battle Rages in Ukraine Town; Russia Shakes Up its Military,’ Associated Press, 12 January 2023, accessed 20 March 2023, available at: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-donetsk-9cc363adc31419311cadb3c5ed8e0601; Paul Niland, ‘Putin’s Mariupol Massacre is One of the 21st Century’s Worst Crimes,’ Atlantic Council, 24 May 2022, accessed 20 March 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-mariupol-massacre-is-one-the-worst-war-crimes-of-the-21st-century/.

[23] Alex Vershinin, ‘The Return of Industrial Warfare,’ RUSI, 17 June 2022, accessed 20 March 2023, available at: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/return-industrial-warfare.

[24] Peter Dickinson, ‘2022 Review: Why Has Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine Invasion Gone So Badly Wrong?,’ Atlantic Council, 19 December 2022, accessed 17 April 2023, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/2022-review-why-has-vladimir-putins-ukraine-invasion-gone-so-badly-wrong/.

[25] John Kirby, ‘Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby,’ White Press Briefing, 16 February 2023, accessed 19 April 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/02/17/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-and-nsc-coordinator-for-strategic-communications-john-kirby-9/.

[26] Andrew Kramer and Antoly Kurmanaev, ‘Ukraine Claims Bahkmut Battle is Wagner’s ‘Last Stand’,’ New York Times, 7 March 2023, accessed 19 April 2023, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/07/world/europe/bakhmut-ukraine-russia-wagner.html.

[27] David Axe, ‘The Donetsk Separatist Army Went to War in Ukraine with 20,000 Men. Statistically, Almost Every Single One of Them Was Killed or Wounded,’ Forbes, 18 November 2022, accessed 19 April 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/11/18/the-donetsk-separatist-army-went-to-war-in-ukraine-with-20000-men-statistically-almost-every-single-one-was-killed-or-wounded/?sh=497acf411c09.

[28] Axe, ‘The Donetsk Separatist Army Went to War in Ukraine,’.

[29] Max Seddon and Christopher Miller, ‘Crimean Bridge Explosion Leaves Russian Supply Lines Exposed,’ Financial Times, 9 October 2022, accessed 19 April 2023, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/453d8aff-b8f2-42a3-919b-10a327475dfb.

[30] Amos Fox, ‘Ukraine and Proxy War: Improving Ontological Shortcomings in Military Thinking,’ Association of the United States Army, Landpower Paper 148 (August 2022): 3-4.

[31] Geraint Hughes, My Enemy’s Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics (Brighton, England: Sussex University Press, 2014), 13-14.

[32] David Lake, ‘Iraq, 2003-2011: Principal Failure,’ in Eli Berman and David Lake, ed., Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence Through Local Agents (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), 240.

[33] Lake, ‘Iraq, 2003-2011,’ in Berman and Lake, ed., Proxy Wars, 240.

[34] Hughes, My Enemy’s Enemy, 5.

[35] Fox, “On Proxy War,” 11.

[36] Fox, “Ukraine and Proxy War,” 11.

[37] Fox, “On Proxy War,” 3-4.

[38] ‘Fact Sheet, US Security Cooperation with Ukraine,’ US Department of State, 4 April 2023, accessed 19 April 2023, available at: https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/.

[39] ‘Fact Sheet, US Security Cooperation with Ukraine,’ US Department of State.

[40] ‘Fact Sheet on US Security Assistance to Ukraine as of 21 April 2022,’ US Defense Department, 22 April 2022, accessed 20 March 2023, available at: https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3007664/fact-sheet-on-us-security-assistance-for-ukraine-roll-up-as-of-april-21-2022/.

[41] ‘Fact Sheet on US Security Assistance to Ukraine.’

[42] ‘Fact Sheet, US Security Cooperation with Ukraine.’

[43] Arabia, Bowen, and Welt, ‘US Security Assistance to Ukraine.’

[44] Ellen Mitchell, ‘Russian has Seen 70,000 to 80,000 Casualties in Attack on Ukraine, Pentagon Says,’ The Hill, 8 August 2022, accessed 20 March 2023, available at: https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3593041-russia-has-seen-70000-to-80000-casualties-in-attack-on-ukraine-pentagon-says/; Jim Garamone, ‘Russian Efforts to Raise Numbers of Troops ‘Unlikely to Succeed,’ US Official Says,’ DoD News, 29 August 2022, accessed 19 April 2023, available at: https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3143381/russian-efforts-to-raise-numbers-of-troops-unlikely-to-succeed-us-official-says/.

[45] ‘Russian Federation: UN Experts Alarmed by Recruitment of Prisoners by “Wagner Group”,’ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 10 March 2023, accessed 20 March 2023, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/russian-federation-un-experts-alarmed-recruitment-prisoners-wagner-group

[46] Eugene Rumer, ‘Putin’s War Against Ukraine: The End of the Beginning,’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 February 2023, accessed 19 April 2023, available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/17/putin-s-war-against-ukraine-end-of-beginning-pub-89071.

[47] ‘Brutality of Russia’s Wagner Gives it a Lead in Ukraine War,’ Associated Press, 27 January 2023, accessed 30 March 2023, available at: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-wagner-group-yevgeny-prigozhin-803da2e3ceda5dace7622cac611087fc

[48] Olivia Yanchik, ‘Human Wave Tactics are Demoralizing the Russian Army in Ukraine,’ Atlantic Council, 8 April 2023, accessed 19 April 2023, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/human-wave-tactics-are-demoralizing-the-russian-army-in-ukraine/.

The conflict in Ukraine offers unexpected insight into a military construct that had previously been mostly theoretical. Ukrainian ground forces, fighting beneath an information domain dominated almost exclusively by American intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, while no U.S. forces fight in the conflict, is what military theorists and strategists in the 1990s described as a vertical coalition. They conceived it as the future of American warfare, during a brief period in which violent ground-based conflict among powerful states was believed, by some, to be vanishing from the world. The correlating concept of sovereign identity, as the founding principle of nation-statehood, was considered by these vanguard thinkers to be malleable or changing in historically unprecedented ways. Tracing the brief history of vertical coalitions reveals the unravelling of an entire way of seeing the world, even as the construct makes its first appearance in the most unexpected war of the 21st century. That history offers a live study in how truth, hubris, and reality trade blows through the lens of military technology and concepts under modern conditions.

Vertical Coalitions

Accompanied by the misappropriation of several insights from the natural sciences, lots of talk in the 90s within the U.S. national security and strategy communities centred on what advantages could be expected from the future of networked digital information technologies.[1] As essentially the owner and administrator, the U.S. stood peerless atop this regime of tech. No other nation approached the American military’s capacity to sense and shoot with rising precision. But how would such dominant battlespace knowledge be translated into military and strategic outcomes? Serious heads such as the late Andrew Marshall and his pupil Andrew Krepinevich frequently counselled on the need for technological innovations to be culturally and organisationally materialised for advantage to accrue, lest their value be squandered.[2] One answer spanning the gamut from tactics to strategy was the concept of vertical coalitions.[3] Vertical coalitions offered a U.S. military enterprise wielding dominant battlespace knowledge the prospect of greater strategic value, for lower operational cost, and reduced political risk.

Vertical coalitions were a military adaptation of the vertical alliance concept in corporate business. There it describes a business-level strategic relationship between a firm and its suppliers or distributors aimed at improving competitive advantage. Vertical alliances deepen relationships between the firm and its suppliers and distributors through the exchange of knowledge and commercial intelligence to mutual benefit. When a supplier or distributor agrees to work exclusively with a firm, it can bring about a lock-out dynamic that further enhances the firm’s competitive advantage by denying valuable commercial intelligence to rivals. Suppliers benefit by becoming actively involved in product design and distribution arrangements. A supplier might only agree to being locked in if it sees for itself a strategic advantage in doing so, for example where a firm might have a powerful market position or, better yet, a monopoly. Choosing the right partner is an important factor in the success of the strategy, making common intentions and compatible visions of the business a must. In the business world, actors considering a vertical alliance analyse each other’s corporate cultures to map learning opportunities and avert communication problems. It’s easy to see why military thinkers considering the implications of the digital networked age would be attracted.

One of the chief thinkers on vertical coalitions for the military was Martin Libicki. He described the way U.S. air power and expeditionary forces were used in combination with a beleaguered ally that was expected to provide the bulk of ground forces. In contrast to horizontal coalitions, which involved two or more brigades fighting side-by-side, Libicki thought that future military coalitions would be decidedly more vertical and that the emerging concept of dominant battlespace knowledge would be the critical enabler. In sum, it was a vision for how the United States would fight and win in the future. In 1995, Libicki wrote:

We would supply overall intelligence on the whereabouts and movements of distant echelons. Our overhead systems (both space and air breathing) would permit pinpointing of enemy platforms. Our distributed sensor systems would be put in place to operate, analyze, and convert data into fire-control solutions. This would permit friendly forces to take precise measure of the enemy, providing them with real-time one-shot, one-kill capability. We might even control the targeting once they have fielded the weapon. In some cases, the United States might be able to tilt the contest to one side without unambiguous proof that we had intervened at all. The use of stand-off sensors as a substitute for forces also frees us from the necessity of overseas bases; they permit more operations to be planned and conducted from international waters.[4]

Critically, vertical coalitions offered partner states a quid pro quo. As the predominant actor in the information domain, the U.S. was conceivably able to provide access to otherwise unavailable information to partner states. In this way, the dominant battlespace knowledge concept was plausibly scalable. It did not apply only to high-intensity warfare. The U.S. could provide information on everything from environmental degradation, law enforcement particularly in the maritime domain, transportation, transnational crime, disaster relief and so forth. In return, U.S. sensor systems require access to such entities as open skies, extant monitors and databases, supply lines and logistics would be granted. Libicki sensed the underlying political tension. He thought that such an arrangement was contingent on the provision of information at such a level of detail that the U.S. could not be accused of only giving access to information that only supported  its objectives.

Nonetheless, the status of the U.S. would have a subtle but pervasive effect on what partners saw when they plugged into the system. It guarded U.S. sensitivities, emphasised strengths, and acted as a powerful moderator by reinforcing some transparency. Broadly speaking, Libicki enunciated a vision of the illumination of the battle space and the unbundling inclusion of allies and partners to keep alliances and coalitions together, drive down risk and mistrust, and increase cooperation.[5]

This expansive vision had a technical Achilles heel. How would vertical coalitions turn out in a world where cyber vulnerability became the defining condition of the electromagnetic spectrum? Further, was it a realistic prospect when politics among nations returned to historical norms, after a brief and hubristic post-Cold War hiatus? Either way, few military analysts anticipated we would get the chance to see a vertical coalition in action, let alone in a war with the Russian Federation in the 21st century. The fate of nation-states in vertical coalitions with the U.S. should now be front of mind in every capital in which the digital age progresses apace, because we are watching the construct operate in the furnace of battle. 

Though each observation may be accurate on its own terms, each is also incomplete. These officers, like most, view the world through the lens they have developed over a career in their particular branch of service and career specialty. A bureaucratic model of politics suggests that “where you stand depends on where you sit.”[4] You see what you see, you study that which you see, and the evidence sought and found will tend to support predetermined notions.

What does this have to do with the assumptions made prior to and during this particular conflict in Ukraine? First, the quote about logistics is true to the point of being cliché. Second, it has been well-established that a lack of air superiority is problematic on the battlefield. Yet, when neither side dominates the air, other aspects of offense and defense come into the fore. Lastly, Sun Tzu could have made the same observation about reconnaissance thousands of years ago. These observations regarding the viewpoints of senior leaders are not meant to demean the intelligence of these leaders, but to suggest that our understanding of the unfolding situation is incomplete and simplistic. It is easy to armchair quarterback this conflict at the tactical level, but it is not over yet. While the military in particular may be able to glean early tactical lessons from both sides of this conflict, it is too early to draw operational and strategic lessons from this war. Much like correctly predicting when or where the next war will occur, accurately predicting the final results of this conflict is improbable—especially regarding potential enduring second- and third-order effects. Yet, valid expectations about war and peace, interstate relationships, and the future of conflict are possible. Tactics change with context, strategy less so. An assumption that the use of military force—even naked aggression—will continue to be a key aspect of international relations will endure.

There are several military and political assumptions regarding the war in Ukraine worthy of continued discussion. For example, Russia likely assumed the objectives of the invasion would be achieved quickly, and Ukraine would not be able to offer significant resistance. The West assumed that Russia would not continue an invasion if it faced stiff resistance. Some pundits may have assumed the war Russia launched was merely limited in nature, seeking to secure a route to a warm sea port or to protect ethnic Russians. Others assumed Russian aggression was to secure a key industrial and agricultural region of the former Soviet Union that Russia cannot afford to lose.[5] Another important assumption is that Putin would possibly back down in the face of near-universal condemnation of his actions.[6]

All of these assumptions are important, but too specific to the context to be useful in the examination of possible future events. What the situation does provide is additional evidence in the empirical record that assumptions central to liberal international relations theory are faulty. That international relations have moved beyond realpolitik and hard-nosed calculations based on relative power and position is incorrect. Even the Strategy Bridge call for papers provides some insight into what those assumptions might be, given the use of the term “Russia’s naked aggression,” indicating a moral element to the situation.[7] To quote a famous movie character, “Is there another kind?”[8]

A Notch for Neorealist Theory

A brief review of the primary assumptions of neorealist scholarship is necessary. First, interstate interactions take place within a system of anarchy. There is no power or authority higher than the state that is empowered to enforce international rules or to prevent one state from attacking or otherwise harming another. Second, because of the anarchical nature of the world, states must always be concerned about their own survival. This leads to a third crucial point—that states seek security as their primary interest. Liberal theory suggests that once state security is assured, the state can have myriad additional interests, which can lead to instances of cooperation, and possibly even enduring peace. In contrast, neorealist literature expects that cooperation through alliances is merely a byproduct of the quest for survival and security. Neorealism expects that in a world characterized by anarchy, cooperation only occurs when it benefits the security interests of a state.

Scholars, policymakers, and military experts should not conflate the way the world works—as it is characterized by anarchy, survival, security—with the conduct or results of a specific conflict. The execution of combat operations and the results of those operations should not lead military and political experts to conclusions that naked aggression may be prevented by strong alliances among liberal democracies. Nor should potential military success in Ukraine create the false impression that at some future point other states will not act aggressively. The neorealist expectation that Russia felt threatened by NATO expansion, as posited by noted scholars George Kennan and John Mearsheimer, resulted in predictable behavior.[9] No matter how naked the aggression is deemed by others, how ill-informed the attack was, or ill-fated the Russian invasion might turn out to be, military failure in any instance cannot and should not influence thinking on how the world works in terms of the potential triggers for violent actions by state actors. That said, a brief examination of key liberal assumptions that have been challenged by this specific situation is in order.

Challenged liberal assumption #1: State survival and security are no longer the primary concern of the modern state. Cooperation between states is more economically sound. A neorealist would assume that Ukraine would beg to differ and wishes it could go back in time and make preparations for its own security.

Challenged liberal assumption #2: Modern alliances, unlike those of the past, are stable and reliable. The enduring NATO alliance purportedly provides evidence to support this assumption. However, the enduring nature of NATO is easier to explain. NATO survives because the threat endures.

To mark the passing of a year since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent return of high intensity conflict to Europe, we wanted to look to the recent past instead of to an unknown future. We asked: How then should we reflect on this experience? What happened to our previously held assumptions in the wake of Russia’s aggression? Which assumptions were challenged; which were validated?

Looking to the past instead of the future has a few distinct conceptual advantages. First, the desire to collect lessons learned often drives analysis to the tactical or, at best, operational level where information is more granular and events and actions are easier to measure or quantify. Second, these analyses look to apply lessons in preparation for the next conflict—though we cannot know how, when, or where it will take place. Militaries are notoriously bad at predicting future conflicts and this is likely even more true in the middle of a conflict. 

Our community approached this question from a number of different perspectives. Taken together these perspectives offer a well-rounded understanding of the nature of the assumptions that were in play prior to the conflict and how they shape the state of the conflict today.

Beginning with the issue of grand strategy, Brent Lawniczak questions many of the assumptions of liberal international relations to offer a neorealist perspective as a better alternative for understanding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among a number of neorealist assumptions he sees validated, for example, he views alliances as existing primarily for survival and self-interest. 

Next, Zac Rogers highlights how Ukraine has brought into play the unexpected costs of vertical coalitions. This idea came into prominence in the 1990s in light of US technological ascendency. Partners would be expected to provide the bulk of ground forces while the US would contribute more exquisite capabilities such as airpower. Ukraine has now challenged that model, Rogers argues. For example, the extent to which the kill chain has been spread horizontally through numerous nations creates legitimate targets outside Ukraine, thus resulting in the significant expansion of risk, thus greatly amplifying the costs to the US of these coalitions.

Amos Fox then provides an important perspective to how we can next understand the war in Ukraine as undergirded by the dynamics of proxy war. The firepower that the US provides to Ukraine results in Russia’s response to protect its conventional army by using human wave tactics made possible by drawing on prisoners and Wagner mercenaries. Taken together, the two proxy approaches result in costly attrition because each proxy’s strategies “feed off” the other’s. 

Rowan Wise then addresses the nuclear spectre. Framing his article within the long history of Russia relations with the West, he stresses how the Soviet Union’s development of a nuclear arsenal changed that relationship considerably. Borrowing from Clausewitz, Wise asks the reader to consider what political objectives the U.S. might be seeking and how those might be problematic in light of Russia’s nuclear weapons. 

Shifting from nuclear weapons, Jon Beto examines why Russia’s seemingly vaunted cyber and electronic capabilities did not seem to be as effective as anticipated. Beto explores Putin’s problematic assumption regarding Russian superiority and how this created complacency because “it’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so” that will get you in trouble.

Similarly, Joshua Ratta looks at Russian problems in hybrid warfare given some pre-2022 thinking that Russia had “perfected” this form of warfare.  What this view failed to see, is that Russia’s 2014 success in Ukraine owed much to the “opportune conglomeration of fortuitous circumstances and opponent weaknesses in Russian targeted areas.” The U.S. has also demonstrated that it is better at hybrid warfare than some initially thought. Although hybrid warfare proved to be overhyped, it will continue to be used by both Russia and the US as they engage in strategic competition.

Even more amorphous than hybrid warfare, yet equally powerful, is the battle for meaning occurring in the digital sphere. Nathan White argues observers too often measure progress in this conflict in terms of the geographical progression of the conflict on a map when the battlespace in the digital realm—such as public opinion, for example—could be an even more critical realm. 

Mariya Omelicheva picks up on similar themes, suggesting “mainstream perspectives on war ascribe an outsized importance to the tangible aspects of conflict and underplay the role of intangibles as useful guides for understanding the sources and outcomes of war.” Because war is as much shaped by the larger society that enables it as it is by its combatants, it is essential to understand the national identity of one’s opponent to understand that war’s character. To understand Russia’s war in Ukraine, one must above all understand Russian identity. 

Our series then pivots back to Clausewitz’s notion of friction. Alessandra Nisch urges the U.S. to draw on John Boyd’s injunction to operationalize friction. Nisch reveals how much friction ultimately benefited Ukraine. Due to externally applied friction in Ukraine such as the quick imposition of economic sanctions, Putin’s primary assumptions—“that the invasion of Ukraine would be quick and easily accomplished, that the world would denounce but not stop it, and that it would sufficiently deter NATO expansion”—all crumbled under the imposition of external friction from U.S. and NATO partners.

In a similar sphere, Nathan Colvin uses the war in Ukraine to challenge U.S. assumptions about the likelihood of large-scale combat operations. He argues this conflict demonstrates that the “costs of modern conventional war are so high it is difficult to justify its use.” While the U.S. should continue to focus on large-scale combat operations, the primary reason is to deter conventional war since it is highly unlikely to occur. The challenge for the U.S., however, comes in balancing that investment with developing the ability to engage in non-large-scale combat operations, which is essential to enabling deterrence by denial.   

Should deterrence fail, Julian Waller then explores how problematic Russian assumptions can be useful for the U.S. in light of potential engagement with either Iran or China. In both of these cases, the most important lesson the U.S. can glean is regarding “ideological realities on the ground” of both elites and the population at large. Russia’s faults in Ukraine represented more than a simply intelligence failure but also highly-flawed “sociopolitical assumptions.” 

Jerry Garzon explores both deterrence and flawed assumptions in his analysis of whether economic deterrence works or not. Prior to invading Ukraine, Russia made several reasonable but ultimately flawed assumptions, one of which was that it would not be subject to crippling economic measures given past historical precedent. Thus the U.S. did not offer a credible economic deterrent. And, while not necessarily showing a noticeable impact, quickly-imposed economic measures may prove just as significant as what is occurring on the battlefield. 

Finally, Robert Umholtz ruminates on possible outcomes to the conflict. Contextualizing this conflict within a long legacy of invasions, scorched earth policies, and popular insurgencies reveals that both sides will pay any cost to win. He predicts that diplomacy will not bring the two nations to any sort of compromise, with neither side being content to cede the ultimate prize: Crimea.

We hope you get as much from reading these essays as we did!