Notes:
[1] Jane Butler, Ross Coffey, Kathryn Pegues, and John Salvador, “Data Analytics in the Combatant Command: Improving the Approach to Decision-Making,” Strategy Bridge, September 6, 2021, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/9/6/data-analytics-in-the-combatant-command-improving-the-approach-to-decision-making.
[2] Jill R. Russell, “With rifle and bibliography: General Mattis on professional reading,” Strife, May 7, 2013,
[3] Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 85-89.
[4] Alex Roland, “War and Technology,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 27, 2009, https://www.fpri.org/article/2009/02/war-and-technology/.
[5] Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College 11, No. 1 (1981): 14.
[6] Williamson Murray, “Armored warfare: The British, French, and German experiences,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37–39.
[7] Ibid., 29–32.
[8] “The German ‘Lightning War’ Strategy Of The Second World War,” Imperial War Museums, accessed December 15, 2022, https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-german-lightning-war-strategy-of-the-second-world-war.
[9] Azar Gat, “British Influence and the Evolution of the Panzer Arm: Myth or Reality? Part I,” War in History 4, No. 2 (April 1997); Azar Gat, “British Influence and the Evolution of the Panzer Arm: Myth or Reality? Part II,” War in History 4, No. 3 (July 1997).
[10] Von Clausewitz, On War, 593.
[11] Indeed, the Merriam-Webster dictionary defines it as “a defensive barrier or strategy that inspires a false sense of security”; Enno Kraehe, “The Motives behind the Maginot Line,” Military Affairs 8, No. 2 (Summer 1944): 112-113.
[12] Stephen Biddle, “Ukraine and the Future of Offensive Maneuver,” War on the Rocks, November 22, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/ukraine-and-the-future-of-offensive-maneuver/.
[13] Ian Li, “The Importance of Context for Military History and Education,” POINTER: Journal of the SAF 46, No. 2 (2020): 57-58.
[14] J. Boone Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory,” Parameters 38, No. 2 (Summer 2008): 31-33.
[15] Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998).
[16] David Berkland, “Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell, and the Future of Airpower,” Defense & Security Analysis 27, No. 4 (December 2011): 389-390.
[17] Neta C. Crawford, “Targeting Civilians and U.S. Strategic Bombing Norms: Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose?,” in The American Way of Bombing: Changing Ethical and Legal Norms, from B-17s to Drones, eds. Matthew Evangelista and Henry Shue (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2014), 64–68.
[18] Roland, “War and Technology.”
[19] “Fact Sheet: The Digital and Intelligence Service,” MINDEF Singapore, last modified October 28, 2022,
[20] Ian Li, “The U.S.-China Rivalry as Seen in the Cold War’s Rear-View Mirror,” Strategy Bridge, October 1, 2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/10/1/the-us-china-rivalry-as-seen-in-the-cold-wars-rear-view-mirror.
[21] Frank Hoffman, “Learning Large Lessons from Small Wars,” War on the Rocks, February 5, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/02/learning-large-lessons-from-small-wars/.
[22] Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” 14.
[23] Julie Jargon, “How to Tell News Fact from Fiction, Even During a War,” The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-spot-fake-news-even-during-a-war-11646434626.
[24] Biddle, “Ukraine and the Future of Offensive Maneuver.”
[25] William Leben, “Let’s hold our horses on drawing lessons from war in Ukraine,” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 19, 2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/lets-hold-our-horses-on-drawing-lessons-from-war-in-ukraine/.
