Notes:
[1] On a 60 Minutes interview (Sept 18, 2022).
[2] Asked their preferences for “unification,” “the status quo,” or “independence,” nearly 90 percent of Taiwan’s population supports maintaining the status quo with variation across timeline, e.g., “indefinitely” versus “decide at a later date”. (Yvonne Chiu, “Taiwan free to decide, under duress,” Taipei Times, Aug. 26, 2022.)
[3] Shortly after the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s “perimeter speech” (Jan. 12, 1950) ceded Asian affairs outside of a “perimeter” that he drew around Japan and Philippines but which excluded Korea and Taiwan, signalling that the U.S. would no longer support the KMT. When North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, however, President Harry S. Truman decided to defend South Korea (and Taiwan).
[4] The massive waves of Chinese immigration to Taiwan from 1945–1956 as a result of the Chinese Civil War is estimated to around 1 million, which constituted only 15% of Taiwan’s population at the time, and their surviving members and descendents number around 10% now. [Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), The Republic of China Yearbook 2014, p. 48. Dominic Meng-Hsuan Yang, The Great Exodus from China, Cambridge University Press 2021, pp. 63–65. Ko-hua Yap, “Reassessing Number of Mainland Chinese Immigrants with Declassified Archival Data,” Taiwan Historical Research 28(3) Sept 2021: 211–229. 徐富珍 、 陳信木（2004)。︁蕃薯＋芋頭＝臺灣土豆？：臺灣當前族群認同狀況 比較分析。︁在臺灣人口學會主辦、人口、家庭與國民健康政策回顧與展望 研討會、台北市。︁]
Since at least 2008, opinion polls about Taiwanese identity consistently show that the majority of people consider themselves to be solely “Taiwanese,” as opposed to “Chinese” or both, and that portion of the population has only grown over time to between 64 and 85 percent now, depending on the poll. (Since these surveys began in 1992, there has never been a majority or even a plurality that identified solely as “Chinese”; prior to 2008, the prevailing identification was “both.”) This is reflected in post-dictatorship policy changes; for example, Taiwanese language is officially permitted and recent educational reforms include Taiwan history in the curriculum and place less emphasis on Chinese history. (Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, “Changes in Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys 1992–2022 June,” July 12, 2022. Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation, “April 2022 Public Opinion Poll – English Excerpt,” April 26, 2022.)
[5] The foundation of Taiwan’s constitution of the Republic of China’s 1947 constitution, which the KMT adopted when it still governed China. The now vestigial-references above originally date from 1991 additional articles before Taiwan fully democratized.
[6] Lev Nachman and Brian Hioe, “No, Taiwan’s President Isn’t ‘Pro-Independence,’” The Diplomat (online), April 23, 2020. 畢翔 、《務實台獨工作者》賴清德：台灣名字叫中華民國 不必另宣布獨立”、 上報 Up Media (online), March 22, 2019。︁
[7] Thomas J. Christensen, M. Taylor Fravel, Bonnie S. Glaser, Andrew J. Nathan, Jessica Chen Weiss, “How to Avoid a War Over Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs (online), Oct. 13, 2022. Task Force on U.S.-China Policy, Policy Brief: Avoiding War Over Taiwan (online), Oct. 12, 2022 (Asia Society – Center on U.S.-China Relations and UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy – 21st Century China Center).
[8] Edward Wong and Amy Qin, “China’s Push to Isolate Taiwan Demands U.S. Action, Report Says,” The New York Times, Mar. 24, 2022. Stu Woo, “China Makes Sure Everyone Write Taiwan’s Name Just So—Even a Colorado High School,” The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 10, 2021. “Taiwan opens representative office in Lithuania,” Deutsche Welle, Nov. 18, 2021. Andrew Higgins, “In an Uneven Fight with China, a Tiny Country’s Brand Becomes Toxic,” The New York Times, Feb. 21, 2022.
[9] See, for example: Jessica Drun and Bonnie S. Glaser, “The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and Limits on Taiwan’s Access to the United Nations,” German Marshall Fund, Mar. 24, 2022; David Cyranoski, “Taiwan left isolated in fight against SARS. Nature 422, 652 (2003), https://doi.org/10.1038/422652a.
[10] Former government officials speaking on background have reinforced this interpretation of U.S. strategy.
[11] U.S. Public Law 96-8, Taiwan Relations Act, April 10, 1979. Currently, a proposed Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 (S. 4428 – 117th Congress) has been introduced to the U.S. Senate, to attempt to update U.S.-Taiwan relations.
[12] Peter Baker and Zolan Kanno-Youngs, “Biden to Begin New Asia-Pacific Economic Bloc With a Dozen Allies,” The New York Times, May 23, 2022 (updated May 31, 2022). Ana Swanson, “Biden Administration Begins Trade Dialogue With Taiwan,” The New York Times, June 1, 2022.
[13] E.g., all Taiwan’s diplomatic relations, plus Lithuania and the Czech Republic, recently.
