Movement leaders knew from “painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed.”[6] Waging a Good War describes how, after a defensive action in Montgomery, King chose a series of battles over the next decade that presented southern whites with a dilemma between a loss of political power or resorting to increased violence to maintain a system of segregation. This escalation of violence, and the growing attention it received outside the South, forced a reluctant federal government to intervene to enforce equal treatment.[7]
The Movement’s new strategy centered on nonviolent direct action to challenge unjust laws by employing “creative tension” that overwhelmed the system of segregation.
Adapting the Campaign to the Environment
In Nashville, the Movement transitioned from the defensive act of denying patronage to the offensive approach of demanding service at the city’s downtown lunch counters. As in Montgomery, leaders thoroughly planned these defiant actions and demonstrators displayed remarkable discipline. Waging a Good War describes how, drawing inspiration from Gandhi, James Lawson and Diane Nash led workshops in church basements for several months. In squads of twelve, they taught Nashville students about nonviolent action and executed realistic rehearsals that included name-calling and spitting to simulate the violent reactions expected from angry crowds. Lawson observed that “a protest cannot be spontaneous. It has to be systematic. There must be planning, strategy,” what he called “a common discipline.”[8]
As in any campaign, the Movement faced setbacks. The strategy devised by King relied on two external components—violent reaction from opponents of integration and outrage from a broader public—to force the federal government to act. King argued, “In any nonviolent campaign there are four basic steps: collection of the facts to determine whether injustices are alive, negotiation, self-purification, and direct action.”
King focused on identifying locations where the most likely reaction would be violence. The strongholds of racism became ideal targets for the Movement—Montgomery, Nashville, Mississippi, and eventually Selma. However, their efforts stalled when the Movement faced an adaptive adversary in Albany, Georgia. The segregationist Albany Police Chief understood his enemy, planned well in advance for mass detentions, made arrests on charges that couldn’t be challenged as segregation, maintained police discipline during arrests, and engaged directly with the Movement in negotiations. In Albany, the Movement leadership culminated, withdrew, and learned to better choose its adversaries and to adapt its tactics.
In Birmingham’s Public Safety Commissioner, “Bull” Connor, King found an adversary he could rely on to escalate violence in ways that could enable the campaign to achieve progress. Thomas Ricks describes a training center set up in Dorchester, Georgia, to prepare demonstrators as a “school for noncommissioned officers of the civil rights movement.” However, Birmingham was so oppressive that, in the early days of protest, only a handful of demonstrators volunteered to march, knowing it would result in beatings and jail time. Sensing a faltering initiative, King volunteered to march and face arrest. This act, and the publicity generated by publishing his “Letter from The Birmingham Jail,” brought journalists to the city, but the Movement still needed demonstrators.
