In Autumn of Our Discontent, John Curatola contends the Soviet creation of an atomic bomb was not the single determinant for the United State’s 1949 decision to establish a large defense structure. Rather, the almost simultaneous confluence of several events during Autumn of 1949 “sowed the seeds for a review of national security policy.”[1] A principal military historian at the National World War II Museum, Curatola highlights the key game changers as the implementation of George Kennan’s containment policy, the loss of mainland China to communism, the release of the China White Paper, arguments on the ethics of creating a thermonuclear bomb, and the very public rivalry between the U.S. military services. Because each occurred so closely in time, he skillfully asserts, the effect they had on the country’s perspective toward national security “was greater than the sum of their parts.”[2]
Curatola’s title appears to be a salute to the opening speech in William Shakespeare’s Richard III, where Richard of Gloucester declares, “Now is the winter of our discontent, made glorious summer by this sun of York,” revealing the victory of the House of York after years of conflict.[3] Similarly, Curatola reflects on the time of bleak discouragement in U.S. foreign affairs during the autumn of 1949 that led to NSC-68 and its recommended creation of a national security state to defend against the threat of communism.
The book is divided chronologically. Curatola begins his tome with the riveting story of U.S. Air Force intelligence crews uncovering evidence of the first Soviet nuclear test. The rest of the introduction examines other key defense and foreign policy events that occurred immediately following World War II. The essential core of the book, however, the critical events of 1949, are separately explored in two long chapters of 78 and 99 pages, respectively titled “Summer” and “Autumn.” These are followed by a 29-page conclusion, appropriately named “Winter,” covering the related changes in national policy and illuminating the legacy of those changes.
Curatola brilliantly guides the reader through detailed accounts of lesser-known conflicts and debates of the time. He delves into the bitter fight between the Air Force and Navy over roles and missions, revealing the political drama that ensued both publicly and in Congressional hearings. He unveils the muted debates over how to best help the anti-Communist Kuomintang fight in China without supporting their corruption and exploitation of peasants. He also highlights the disconnect between the Atomic Energy Commission and Strategic Air Command over atomic weapon requirements. He reveals the ethical and moral struggles over whether to create a super nuclear fusion bomb or to rely solely on the fission weapons developed at the time.
