Notes:
[1] Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi et al., “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022,” RUSI Special Report (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), November 30, 2022), https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022; Rob Lee and Michael Kofman, “How the Battle for the Donbas Shaped Ukraine’s Success,” Research Article (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, December 23, 2022), https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/12/how-the-battle-for-the-donbas-shaped-ukraines-success/; Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design,” War on the Rocks, June 2, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/.
[2] Julian G. Waller, “Putin’s Agency and the Decision for War,” RIDDLE Russia, May 2023, https://ridl.io/putin-s-agency-and-the-decision-for-war/; Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “Personalist Strongmen: Challenges and Trends,” Democracy Paradox, February 6, 2023, https://democracyparadox.com/2023/02/06/personalist-strongmen-challenges-and-trends/; Zabrodskyi et al., “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine”; Julian G. Waller, “Problems With Russia’s Political Prepwork in the Russo-Ukrainian War,” The National Interest, March 25, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/problems-russia%E2%80%99s-political-prepwork-russo-ukrainian-war-201400; Ivan Gomza, “The War in Ukraine: Putin’s Inevitable Invasion,” Journal of Democracy 33, no. 3 (2022): 23–30, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2022.0036; Jeffrey Edmonds, “Start with the Political: Explaining Russia’s Bungled Invasion of Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, April 28, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/start-with-the-political-explaining-russias-bungled-invasion-of-ukraine/.
[3] Zach Dorfman, “Exclusive: Secret CIA training program in Ukraine helped Kyiv prepare for Russian invasion,” Yahoo!news, March 16, 2022, https://www.yahoo.com/news/exclusive-secret-cia-training-program-in-ukraine-helped-kyiv-prepare-for-russian-invasion-090052743.html
[4] Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth (Georgetown University Press, 2017); Andrei Soldatov and Michael Rochlitz, “The Siloviki in Russian Politics,” in The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin’s Russia, ed. Daniel Treisman (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2018), 88–108; Ulf Walther, “Russia’s Failed Transformation: The Power of the KGB/FSB from Gorbachev to Putin,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 666–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2014.924808.
[5] Daniel W. Drezner, “Present at the Destruction: The Trump Administration and the Foreign Policy Bureaucracy,” The Journal of Politics 81, no. 2 (April 2019): 723–30, https://doi.org/10.1086/702230; Steven B. Redd and Alex Mintz, “Policy Perspectives on National Security and Foreign Policy Decision Making,” Policy Studies Journal 41, no. 1 (2013): 11-S37, https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12010; Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
[6] Yuri M. Zhukov, “Trading Hard Hats for Combat Helmets: The Economics of Rebellion in Eastern Ukraine,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Ukraine: Escape from Post-Soviet Legacy, 44, no. 1 (February 1, 2016): 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2015.10.010; Joanna Szostek, “Russia and the News Media in Ukraine: A Case of ‘Soft Power’?,” East European Politics & Societies and Cultures 28, no. 3 (2014): 463–86, https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325414537297.
[7] Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, “The Real Crisis of Global Order: Illiberalism on the Rise,” Foreign Affairs 101 (February 2022): 103; Constance Duncombe and Tim Dunne, “After Liberal World Order,” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (January 1, 2018): 25–42, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix234.
[8] Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring,” Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (2012): 127–49; Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511977404.
[9] Christina Lai, “More than Carrots and Sticks: Economic Statecraft and Coercion in China–Taiwan Relations from 2000 to 2019,” Politics 42, no. 3 (August 1, 2022): 410–25, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395720962654; Rachel Oswald, “Unique Political Fault Lines in Taiwan Complicate China Resistance,” Roll Call, October 11, 2022, https://www.rollcall.com/2022/10/11/unique-political-fault-lines-in-taiwan-complicate-china-resistance/; Chieh Yen, “Why Taiwan’s Main Opposition Party Can’t Shake Its Pro-China Stance,” January 18, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/why-taiwans-main-opposition-party-cant-shake-its-pro-china-stance/.
[10] Kourosh Rahimkhani, “Political Opposition and Voter Mobilization in an Authoritarian State: The Case of Parliamentary Elections in Iran,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 0, no. 0 (December 8, 2022): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2022.2141687; Güneş Murat Tezcür, “Democracy Promotion, Authoritarian Resiliency, and Political Unrest in Iran,” Democratization 19, no. 1 (February 1, 2012): 120–40, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2012.641296.
[11] Leonie Holthaus and Jonas Wolff, “Practices of Policy Orientation: A Study of the Heterogeneous Field of Democracy Promotion Research,” International Studies Review 25, no. 1 (March 1, 2023): viac062, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viac062; Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion,” April 7, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2006-03-01/backlash-against-democracy-promotion.
[12] Inmaculada Szmolka, “Liberal-Secular Parties in Arab Political Systems,” in Routledge Handbook on Political Parties in the Middle East and North Africa (Routledge, 2020); Dalia F. Fahmy and Daanish Faruqi, Egypt and the Contradictions of Liberalism: Illiberal Intelligentsia and the Future of Egyptian Democracy (Simon and Schuster, 2017).
[13] Theo Farrell, “Military Adaptation and Organisational Convergence in War: Insurgents and International Forces in Afghanistan,” Journal of Strategic Studies 45, no. 5 (July 29, 2022): 718–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1768371; Zach Dorfman, “CIA applies lessons from Iraq ‘debacle’ in information battle over Russian invasion of Ukraine,” Yahoo!news, March 23, 2022, https://news.yahoo.com/cia-applies-lessons-from-iraq-debacle-in-information-battle-over-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-090001168.html; Robert Jervis, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 1 (February 1, 2006): 3–52, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390600566282; Andrew Calabrese, “Casus Belli: U.S. Media and the Justification of the Iraq War,” Television & New Media 6, no. 2 (May 1, 2005): 153–75, https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476404273952.
[14] David V. Gioe and Marina Miron, Putin Should Have Known His Invasion Would Fail, Foreign Policy Magazine, February 24, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/24/ukraine-russia-putin-war-invasion-military-failure/; Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi et al., “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022,” RUSI Special Report (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), November 30, 2022), https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022; Greg Miller and Catherine Belton, “Russia’s spies misread Ukraine and misled Kremlin as war loomed,” August 19, 2022, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-fsb-intelligence-ukraine-war/;
[15] Ilya Zhegulev, “How Putin Came to Hate Ukraine” [КАК ПУТИН ВОЗНЕНАВИДЕЛ УКРАИНУ], Vyorstka, April 25, 2023, https://verstka.media/kak-putin-pridumal-voynu; Igor Burdyga, “The rise and fall of Putin’s man in Ukraine,” openDemocracy, July 2022, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/medvedchuk-putin-poroshenko-treason-ukraine-russia/.
[16] Martin Laryš and Emil A. Souleimanov, “Delegated Rebellions as an Unwanted Byproduct of Subnational Elites’ Miscalculation: A Case Study of the Donbas,” Problems of Post-Communism 69, no. 2 (March 4, 2022): 155–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2021.1943449; Tor Bukkvoll, “Fighting on Behalf of the State—the Issue of pro-Government Militia Autonomy in the Donbas War,” Post-Soviet Affairs 0, no. 0 (May 10, 2019): 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2019.1615810.
[17] Adam Charles Lenton, “Why Didn’t Ukraine Fight for Crimea? Evidence from Declassified National Security and Defense Council Proceedings,” Problems of Post-Communism 69, no. 2 (March 4, 2022): 145–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2021.1901595; Daniel Treisman, ed., The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin’s Russia (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2018).
[18] Kimitaka Matsuzato, “Domestic Politics in Crimea, 2009-2015,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 24, no. 2 (2016): 225–56.
[19] Lenton, “Why Didn’t Ukraine Fight for Crimea?”; Bukkvoll, “Fighting on Behalf of the State—the Issue of pro-Government Militia Autonomy in the Donbas War”; Gwendolyn Sasse and Alice Lackner, “War and Identity: The Case of the Donbas in Ukraine,” Post-Soviet Affairs 34, no. 2–3 (May 4, 2018): 139–57, https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2018.1452209.
[20] Quentin Buckholz, “The Dogs That Didn’t Bark: Elite Preferences and the Failure of Separatism in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk,” Problems of Post-Communism 66, no. 3 (2019): 151–60, https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2017.1367256; Elise Giuliano, “Who Supported Separatism in Donbas? Ethnicity and Popular Opinion at the Start of the Ukraine Crisis,” Post-Soviet Affairs 34, no. 2–3 (May 4, 2018): 158–78, https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2018.1447769.
[21] Atsushi Ogushi, “The Opposition Bloc in Ukraine: A Clientelistic Party with Diminished Administrative Resources,” Europe-Asia Studies 72, no. 10 (November 25, 2020): 1639–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1770701.
[22] Paul D’Anieri, “Ukraine’s 2019 Elections: Pro-Russian Parties and The Impact of Occupation,” Europe-Asia Studies 74, no. 10 (November 26, 2022): 1915–36, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2022.2117793.
[23] Olga Onuch and Henry E. Hale, The Zelensky Effect (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2023).
[24] Jessica Pisano, “How Zelensky Has Changed Ukraine,” Journal of Democracy 33, no. 3 (2022): 5–13, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2022.0034; Sławomir Matuszak and Tadeusz Iwański, “Zelensky vs. Akhmetov – a Test of Strength,” OSW Commentary, December 2021, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2021-12-22/zelensky-vs-akhmetov-a-test-strength; Mykhailo Minakov, “Waiting for the Storm? Ukraine’s Political Situation before the Autumn of 2021,” Wilson Center – Kennan Institute, Focus Ukraine (blog), September 2, 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/waiting-storm-ukraines-political-situation-autumn-2021; Sławomir Matuszak, “Zelensky’s Ukraine: The Mechanisms of Power Are Failing,” OSW Commentary, January 2021, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2021-01-22/zelenskys-ukraine-mechanisms-power-are-failing.
[25] Roman Kravets and Roman Romaniuk, “Kremlin’s Two Plans. Who Would Govern Ukraine If Kyiv Fell,” trans. Myroslava Zavadska, Anton Strii, and Olya Loza, Yahoo News, March 5, 2023, https://news.yahoo.com/kremlins-two-plans-govern-ukraine-163000977.html; Igor Burdyga, “These Are the Men Russia Wanted to Put in Charge of Ukraine,” OpenDemocracy, March 4, 2023, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ukraine-russia-opposition-platform-for-life-medvedchuk-boiko/.
