The Fuzzy Nature of Strategy
Lissner’s argument might seem as obvious as it is compelling. She stresses that her research and analysis goes beyond the merely intuitive and provides insight into how interventions provide crucial opportunities for information gathering. However, it is difficult to generalize from her analysis because three key questions are left unaddressed. First, what is grand strategy? Second, who makes grand strategy? Finally, is grand strategy a stable concept?
Pinning down a concept like grand strategy is challenging. However, it is important for the reader of Lissner’s book to understand what it is and how it is to be observed. Lissner’s initial definition, which describes grand strategy as “the highest-order and most consequential dimension of statecraft” is fuzzy.[8] Something so vast and important seems difficult to discern, and it’s not clear that it could be found in a single document or that it would be authored by a particular person or even group.
Lissner refers to grand strategy almost as though it hangs in the ether. She questions explanations of grand strategy focused on leaders, arguing its evolution was much more continuous than a great leader focus would suggest.[9]
Lissner does not clearly specify the roles and influence of the various policy makers involved in creating and revising grand strategy. In each case study she provides substantial archival evidence of civilian and military leaders gaining information from each intervention and ultimately revising U.S. grand strategy. However, it is not clear who is consistently engaged in the creation and revision of grand strategy and how differences between the players might be resolved.
For example, one might ask why it took the United States so long to learn from the intervention in Vietnam. Lissner notes: “From Johnson’s escalation in 1965 through the end of 1967, however, the Vietnam War’s adverse trends went largely unexamined. To some extent, the messy and multifaceted nature of the conflict on both sides of the north-south border obscured data from coalescing into clear patterns.”[10] The lack of clarity on the positions of various decision makers and the process of creating grand strategy weakens Lissner’s ability to make testable and generalizable claims.
Lissner’s analysis presumes that policymakers agree on a unitary understanding of U.S. grand strategy. Given that grand strategy includes military, economic, and diplomatic calculations, it is hard to imagine that it can be pinned down to one agreed upon meaning at any time. It is possible at any one time that decision makers, holding different kinds of information, could have divergent views of U.S. grand strategy.
Conclusion
Lissner’s Wars of Revelation is a rich and thoughtful discussion of how military interventions provide information to civilian and military leaders about the global security environment and current U.S. capabilities. However, her book leaves unresolved questions about how grand strategies are created, negotiated, and revised. Given the importance of thinking about grand strategy, this book should spur greater discussion about who is involved in these conversations and what influence they have.
