Notes:
[1] Anthony J. Principi et al., “2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report,” September 8, 2005.
[2] “Hypersonic Weapons Development in China, Russia and the United States: Implications for American Security Policy,” AUSA, March 23, 2022, https://www.ausa.org/publications/hypersonic-weapons-development-china-russia-and-united-states-implications-american.
[3] David E Lockwood and George Siehl, “Military Base Closures: A Historical Review from 1988 to 1995,” Congressional Research Service, October 18, 2004, 20.
[4] A“Earmark Database,” Citizens Against Government Waste, accessed April 14, 2022, https://www.cagw.org/reporting/earmarks from 2012-2021.
[5] Matthew Cox, “Pentagon Tells Congress to Stop Buying Equipment It Doesn’t Need,” Military.com, October 31, 2017, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/01/28/pentagon-tells-congress-to-stop-buying-equipment-it-doesnt-need.html.
[6] “Army Fiscal Year 2013 Budget | C-SPAN.Org,” § Committee on Armed Services (2002), https://www.c-span.org/video/?304483-1/army-fiscal-year-2013-budget; Army Fiscal Year 2013 Budget | C-SPAN.org.
[7] Cox, “Stop.”
[8] Cox.
[9] “Congressman Ryan Secures $65 Million for Abrams Tank Modernization,” Representative Tim Ryan, accessed April 13, 2022, http://timryan.house.gov/media/press-releases/congressman-ryan-secures-65-million-abrams-tank-modernization.
[10] Jeremy M Zollin, “MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Joint Planning Studies,” n.d., 157.
[11] Jen Judson, “Creeping Weight of Abrams Tank Concerns Pentagon’s Chief Weapons Tester,” Defense News, January 26, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2021/01/26/creeping-weight-of-abrams-tank-concerns-pentagons-chief-weapons-tester/; Dave Majumdar, “Inside the US Army’s Lethal New M1A2 SEP v3 Abrams Main Battle Tank,” Text, The National Interest (The Center for the National Interest, June 2, 2016), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/inside-the-us-armys-lethal-new-m1a2-sep-v3-abrams-main-16445; “Abrams Main Battle Tank,” Military, March 29, 2022, https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/abrams-main-battle-tank/.
[12] Zollin, “MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Joint Planning Studies.”
[13] “Justification Book,” n.d., 261.
[14] Joint Publication 3-09.3; Zach Beauchamp, “This Airplane Is Hammering ISIS. So Why Is the Air Force Trying to Kill It? – Vox,” Vox, January 26, 2015, https://www.vox.com/2015/1/26/7871943/a-10-warthog; It is worth noting that the Air Force was more interested in the long range bomber and air-to-air combat missions, and only developed the A-10 to prevent the Army from developing the Cobra, the predecessor to the Apache, and taking over the CAS mission. Arden B. Dahl, “The Warthog. The Best Deal the Air Force Never Wanted:” (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 1, 2003), https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA442118.
[15] “A-10C Thunderbolt II,” Air Force, accessed April 19, 2022, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104490/a-10c-thunderbolt-ii/.
[16] Beauchamp, “Beauchamp, ‘Hammering ISIS’”; Sebastien Roblin, “Can the A-10 Warthog Defeat Its Toughest Enemy?,” Text, The National Interest (The Center for the National Interest, August 19, 2016), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-the-10-warthog-defeat-its-toughest-enemy-17413.
[17] David Roza, “Senate to Air Force: You’re Gonna Keep Your A-10 Warthogs and You’re Gonna like It,” Task & Purpose (blog), July 29, 2021, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/air-force-a-10-warthog-funding/.
[18] “Soldiers Fight to Save the A-10 Warthog,” Bloomberg.Com, May 16, 2014, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-15/soldiers-fight-to-save-a-10-warthog-jet.
[19] Roza, “Senate to Air Force.”
[20] Oriana Pawlyk, “Congress Rebuffs Air Force’s Plan to Retire Older Aircraft, Putting A-10 Move on Hold,” Military.com, July 28, 2021, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/07/28/congress-rebuffs-air-forces-plan-retire-older-aircraft-putting-10-move-hold.html; “50 A-10 Facts: Interesting Features of the Warthog,” Military Machine, August 12, 2020, https://militarymachine.com/a-10-warthog/.
[21] Richard Armey, “Politics of the Pork Barrel” (House Floor Statement, Washington, D.C., April 13, 1988), 134 Cong Rec H 1615.
[22] “Military Construction Authorization Act of 1978,” Pub. L. No. 95–82, § 612, 10 USC §2687 (1977). Sec. 612; Christopher T Mann, “Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC): Background and Issues for Congress,” n.d., 45.; Armey, “Pork Barrel.”
[23] Closing Military Bases | Interview with Rep. Richard Armey (R-Texas) (C-SPAN, 1988), https://www.c-span.org/video/?2488-1/closing-military-bases; Lockwood and Siehl, “97-305 F.”
[24] “Economic Policy 1987: Bases: A History of Protection by the System,” in CQ Almanac 1987, vol. 43, CQ Almanac Online Edition (Washington, D.C., United States: Congressional Quarterly, 1988), 441, http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal87-1144056. Prior to 1977, the management of which bases to close or add was largely an executive branch decision. After the imposition of the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act requirements to military bases through the O’Neill-Cohen amendment, Defense Secretary Frank C Carlucci noted that the new requirements would tie a base closing up in “knots forever by endless procedures and litigation and political pressure to the point where the Defense Department finally throws up its hands and says ‘We just cannot do this.’” (as quoted in the above document)
[25] P.L. 100-526. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Title XXIV of PL 101-510) created three additional commissions to operate in 1991, 1993 and 1995; Mann, “Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC): Background and Issues for Congress,” 4; Armey, “Pork Barrel.” Remarks made by Rep. Upton. In April 2022, the amount would be between $6.075 billion and $12.2 billion. Calculated at OfficialData.Org on April 13, 2022.
[26] Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-510, Title XXIX of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, enacted November 5, 1990), and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, (P.L. 107-107; amended the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-510) .
[27] “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC),” April 30, 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20190430171317/https://www.brac.gov/.
[28] Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (As amended through FY 05 Authorization Act) §2903(a), accessed at https://web.archive.org/web/20190524115712/https://www.brac.gov/docs/BRAC05Legislation.pdf on April 14, 2022; “Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005,” Pub. L. No. 108–375 (2004) §2913.
[29] The military value criteria included four distinct components (FY2005 NDAA, §2913):
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The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
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The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
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The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
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The cost of operations and the manpower implications.
[30] “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (PL 101-510 Section 2901 et Seq.) as Amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, (PL 107-107 Section 3001 et Seq.) and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, (PL 108-375 Section 2913 et Seq.),” United States § (2019). §2912(b).
[31] Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (PL 101-510 section 2901 et seq.) as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, (PL 107-107 section 3001 et seq.) and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, (PL 108-375 section 2913 et seq.). §2914
[32] Mann, “Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC): Background and Issues for Congress.”
[33] Mann, 2.
[34] “Senate Confirmation Process Slows to a Crawl” (Partnership for Public Service: Center for Presidential Transition, January 20, 2020), https://presidentialtransition.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2020/01/Senate-Confirmations-Issue-Brief.pdf.
[35] See e.g., “Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020: Export-Import Bank Extension,” Pub. L. No. 116–94, § 409, 12 US § 635a(c)(6)(B) (2019); Agencies that should be consider include the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Education, Energy, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor, State, Transportation, Treasury as well as the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Small Business Administration. Each of those agencies would have valuable perspectives to add to the process.
[36] “Budget Functions,” House Budget Committee Democrats, March 31, 2016, https://budget.house.gov/budgets/budget-functions.
[37] “Law | U.S. Department of Labor,” accessed May 25, 2022, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/tradeact/laws.
[38] “Officials Should Resign Over Base Closing, House Leader Says,” accessed April 12, 2022, https://www.oklahoman.com/story/news/1998/05/05/officials-should-resign-over-base-closing-house-leader-says/62282581007/.
[39] Mann, “Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC): Background and Issues for Congress,” 10.
[40] Tadlock Cowan, “Military Base Closures: Socioeconomic Impacts,” RS22147, n.d., 9.
[41] “U.S. Defense Spending Compared to Other Countries,” accessed April 20, 2022, https://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0053_defense-comparison.
