Though each observation may be accurate on its own terms, each is also incomplete. These officers, like most, view the world through the lens they have developed over a career in their particular branch of service and career specialty. A bureaucratic model of politics suggests that “where you stand depends on where you sit.”[4] You see what you see, you study that which you see, and the evidence sought and found will tend to support predetermined notions.
What does this have to do with the assumptions made prior to and during this particular conflict in Ukraine? First, the quote about logistics is true to the point of being cliché. Second, it has been well-established that a lack of air superiority is problematic on the battlefield. Yet, when neither side dominates the air, other aspects of offense and defense come into the fore. Lastly, Sun Tzu could have made the same observation about reconnaissance thousands of years ago. These observations regarding the viewpoints of senior leaders are not meant to demean the intelligence of these leaders, but to suggest that our understanding of the unfolding situation is incomplete and simplistic. It is easy to armchair quarterback this conflict at the tactical level, but it is not over yet. While the military in particular may be able to glean early tactical lessons from both sides of this conflict, it is too early to draw operational and strategic lessons from this war. Much like correctly predicting when or where the next war will occur, accurately predicting the final results of this conflict is improbable—especially regarding potential enduring second- and third-order effects. Yet, valid expectations about war and peace, interstate relationships, and the future of conflict are possible. Tactics change with context, strategy less so. An assumption that the use of military force—even naked aggression—will continue to be a key aspect of international relations will endure.
There are several military and political assumptions regarding the war in Ukraine worthy of continued discussion. For example, Russia likely assumed the objectives of the invasion would be achieved quickly, and Ukraine would not be able to offer significant resistance. The West assumed that Russia would not continue an invasion if it faced stiff resistance. Some pundits may have assumed the war Russia launched was merely limited in nature, seeking to secure a route to a warm sea port or to protect ethnic Russians. Others assumed Russian aggression was to secure a key industrial and agricultural region of the former Soviet Union that Russia cannot afford to lose.[5] Another important assumption is that Putin would possibly back down in the face of near-universal condemnation of his actions.[6]
All of these assumptions are important, but too specific to the context to be useful in the examination of possible future events. What the situation does provide is additional evidence in the empirical record that assumptions central to liberal international relations theory are faulty. That international relations have moved beyond realpolitik and hard-nosed calculations based on relative power and position is incorrect. Even the Strategy Bridge call for papers provides some insight into what those assumptions might be, given the use of the term “Russia’s naked aggression,” indicating a moral element to the situation.[7] To quote a famous movie character, “Is there another kind?”[8]
A Notch for Neorealist Theory
A brief review of the primary assumptions of neorealist scholarship is necessary. First, interstate interactions take place within a system of anarchy. There is no power or authority higher than the state that is empowered to enforce international rules or to prevent one state from attacking or otherwise harming another. Second, because of the anarchical nature of the world, states must always be concerned about their own survival. This leads to a third crucial point—that states seek security as their primary interest. Liberal theory suggests that once state security is assured, the state can have myriad additional interests, which can lead to instances of cooperation, and possibly even enduring peace. In contrast, neorealist literature expects that cooperation through alliances is merely a byproduct of the quest for survival and security. Neorealism expects that in a world characterized by anarchy, cooperation only occurs when it benefits the security interests of a state.
Scholars, policymakers, and military experts should not conflate the way the world works—as it is characterized by anarchy, survival, security—with the conduct or results of a specific conflict. The execution of combat operations and the results of those operations should not lead military and political experts to conclusions that naked aggression may be prevented by strong alliances among liberal democracies. Nor should potential military success in Ukraine create the false impression that at some future point other states will not act aggressively. The neorealist expectation that Russia felt threatened by NATO expansion, as posited by noted scholars George Kennan and John Mearsheimer, resulted in predictable behavior.[9] No matter how naked the aggression is deemed by others, how ill-informed the attack was, or ill-fated the Russian invasion might turn out to be, military failure in any instance cannot and should not influence thinking on how the world works in terms of the potential triggers for violent actions by state actors. That said, a brief examination of key liberal assumptions that have been challenged by this specific situation is in order.
Challenged liberal assumption #1: State survival and security are no longer the primary concern of the modern state. Cooperation between states is more economically sound. A neorealist would assume that Ukraine would beg to differ and wishes it could go back in time and make preparations for its own security.
Challenged liberal assumption #2: Modern alliances, unlike those of the past, are stable and reliable. The enduring NATO alliance purportedly provides evidence to support this assumption. However, the enduring nature of NATO is easier to explain. NATO survives because the threat endures.
