Notes:
[1] “Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge” (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2018), 2.
[2] George F. Kennan, “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare” (Wilson Center Digital Archive, April 30, 1948), https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/george-f-kennan-inauguration-organized-political-warfare-redacted-version.
[3] Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 94–109, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311699.
[4] Fumio Ota, “Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy,” Joint Force Quarterly 73 (April 1, 2014): 78, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/577507/sun-tzu-in-contemporary-chinese-strategy/https%3A%2F%2Fndupress.ndu.edu%2FMedia%2FNews%2FNews-Article-View%2FArticle%2F577507%2Fsun-tzu-in-contemporary-chinese-strategy%2F.
[5] Duncan Hollis, “The Influence of War; the War for Influence Notes & Comments,” Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 32, no. 1 (2018): 31–46.
[6] Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett, Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the US Approach (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989), xi.
[7] Kennan, “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare”; Kerry Gershaneck, “To Win without Fighting: Defining China’s Political Warfare,” Expeditions with MCUP, June 17, 2020, 4, https://doi.org/10.36304/ExpwMCUP.2020.04.
[8] Kennan, “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare”; Gershaneck, “To Win without Fighting,” 4.
[9] Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Department of Defense Directive 3600.01,” DoDD 3600.01 § (2017), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/360001p.pdf; Edwin S. Cochran, U.S. Department of Defense, Retired, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’: People’s Liberation Army Influence Operations,” International Bulletin of Political Psychology 20, no. 3 (September 7, 2020): 11–12, https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol20/iss3/1.
[10] Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2013), 88–89.
[11] Ota, “Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy.”
[12] Michael Clarke, “China’s Application of the ‘Three Warfares’ in the South China Sea and Xinjiang,” Orbis 63, no. Spring (January 2019): 189–94, https://doi.org/doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2019.02.007.
[13] Peter Mattis, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’ in Perspective,” War on the Rocks, January 30, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/chinas-three-warfares-perspective/.
[14] Mao Zedong, “On Correcting Mistaken Views in the Party,” in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 1929, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_5.htm.
[15] Clarke, “China’s Application of the ‘Three Warfares’ in the South China Sea and Xinjiang,” 194; Katja Drinhausen and Helena Legarda, “Confident Paranoia: Xi’s Comprehensive National Security Framework Shapes China’s Behavior at Home and Abroad,” China Monitor (Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies, September 15, 2022), https://www.merics.org/en/report/comprehensive-national-security-unleashed-how-xis-approach-shapes-chinas-policies-home-and.
[16] Edwin S. Cochran, U.S. Department of Defense, Retired, “China’s ‘Three Warfares,’” 23–24.
[17] Gershaneck, “To Win without Fighting,” 7–9.
[18] Peter Mattis, “Contrasting China’s and Russia’s Influence Operations,” War on the Rocks, January 16, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/contrasting-chinas-russias-influence-operations/.
[19] Mattis, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’ in Perspective.”
[20] Halper, China: The Three Warfares, 31–32; David Lai, Andrew Scobell, and Roy Kamphausen, Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War College, 2011), 158–59.
[21] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), 1–9.
[22] Clarke, “China’s Application of the ‘Three Warfares’ in the South China Sea and Xinjiang,” 191; Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, 1–9.
[23] Edwin S. Cochran, U.S. Department of Defense, Retired, “China’s ‘Three Warfares,’” 3–4.
[24] Elsa Kania, “The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares,” China Brief 16, no. 13 (August 22, 2016), https://jamestown.org/program/the-plas-latest-strategic-thinking-on-the-three-warfares/.
[25] Mattis, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’ in Perspective.”
[26] Halper, China: The Three Warfares, 12.
[27] Ibid, 30.
[28] Kania, “The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares.”
[29] Mattis, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’ in Perspective.”
[30] Similar maritime boundary disputes are present in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea. But this paper focuses on the South China Sea due to space constraints.
[31] Michael McDevitt, “Becoming a Great Maritime Power: A Chinese Dream” (Arlington: CNA: Analysis & Solutions, June 2016), 10–14, https://www.cna.org/news/events/china-and-maritime-power.
[32] Richard W. Maass, “Salami Tactics: Faits Accomplis and International Expansion in the Shadow of Major War,” Texas National Security Review 5, no. 1 (2022), https://doi.org/10.26153/tsw/21615.
[33] Gershaneck, “To Win without Fighting,” 14–15.
[34] Doug Livermore, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’ In Theory and Practice in the South China Sea,” Georgetown Security Studies Review, March 25, 2018, https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2018/03/25/chinas-three-warfares-in-theory-and-practice-in-the-south-china-sea/; Clarke, “China’s Application of the ‘Three Warfares’ in the South China Sea and Xinjiang,” 194–96.
[35] Brian Montopoli, “In Full: U.S.-China Joint Statement,” CBS News, November 17, 2009, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/in-full-us-china-joint-statement/.
[36] Halper, China: The Three Warfares, 30–31; Clarke, “China’s Application of the ‘Three Warfares’ in the South China Sea and Xinjiang,” 194–96; Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 43, https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691178264/the-unquiet-frontier.
[37] Grygiel and Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier, 66.
[38] Clarke, “China’s Application of the ‘Three Warfares’ in the South China Sea and Xinjiang,” 198; Liza Tobin, “Underway—Beijing’s Strategy to Build China into a Maritime Great Power,” Naval War College Review 71, no. 2 (March 27, 2018): 20–21, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/5; Gershaneck, “To Win without Fighting,” 9.
[39] Carl Thayer, “China’s Information Warfare Campaign and the South China Sea: Bring It On!,” The Diplomat, June 16, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-information-warfare-campaign-and-the-south-china-sea-bring-it-on/.
[40] Halper, China: The Three Warfares, 28–30.
[41] Linh Tong, “The Social Media ‘War’ Over the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, July 16, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-social-media-war-over-the-south-china-sea/.
[42] Clarke, “China’s Application of the ‘Three Warfares’ in the South China Sea and Xinjiang,” 199.
