Notes:
[1] Renée Diresta, Carly Miller, Vanessa Molter, John Pomfret, and Glenn Tiffert, Telling China’s Story: The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign to Shape Global Narratives, (Stanford, CA: Stanford Digital Repository, 2020), 44, 47, https://doi.org/10.25740/pf306sw8941.
[2] Diresta et al, Telling China’s Story, 44. See also Craig Timberg and Shane Harris, “Chinese Network of Fake Accounts Targets Trump,” The Washington Post, August 13, 2020, https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/chinese-network-fake-accounts-targets-trump/docview/2433067427/se-2.
[3] Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Michael S. Chase, Borrowing a Boat Out to Sea: The Chinese Military’s Use of Social Media for Influence Operations, (Washington, DC: John Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 2019), v, https://www.fpi.sais-jhu.edu/borrowing-a-boat-out-to-sea-pdf.
[4] Samantha Korta, “Fake News, Conspiracy Theories, and Lies: An Information Laundering Model for Homeland Security,” Homeland Security Affairs (March 2018): 80, https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/fake-news-conspiracy-theories-lies-information/docview/2206253872/se-2
[5] Ibid.
[6] Korta, “Fake News,” 84.
[7] Korta, “Fake News,” 99.
[8] Noah Arjomand, “Information Laundering and Globalized Media: Part I – The Problem,” Center for International Media Assistance (blog), August 20, 2019, https://www.cima.ned.org/blog/information-laundering-and-globalized-media-part-i-the-problem/.
[9] Korta, “Fake News,” 77.
[10] Korta, “Fake News,” 81.
[11] Cindy Otis, “The Mainstreaming of Conspiracy Theories,” interview by Darragh Worland, Is That A Fact, News Literacy Project, audio transcript, https://newslit.org/podcast/the-mainstreaming-of-conspiracy-theories/.
[12] Sanja Kelly, Mai Truong, Adrian Shahbaz, Madeline Earp, Jessica White, Manipulating Social Media to Undermine Democracy (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2017), 2, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2017/manipulating-social-media-undermine-democracy.
[13] Korta, “Fake News,” 88-89.
[14] Kelly et al, Manipulating Social Media to Undermine Democracy, 15
[15] Korta, “Fake News,” 62, 73
[16] Elena-Alexandra Dumitru, “Is ‘Letting the Truth Get in the Way of a Good Story’ enough? Journalists’ Perception on Fake News,” Journal of Media Research 14, no. 3 (November 2021): 76, https://www.proquest.com/docview/2615893167.
[17] Vosoughi Soroush, Deb Roy, and Aral Sinan, “The Spread of True and False News Online.” Science 359, no. 6380 (March 2018): 1150, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559.
[18] Vosoughi Soroush et al, “The Spread of True and False News Online,” 1147, 1149.
[19] Vosoughi Soroush et al, “The Spread of True and False News Online,” 1150.
[20] Kenton Thibaut, Chinese Discourse Power: Ambitions and reality in the digital domain (Washington DC: Atlantic Council Digital Forensic Research Lab, 2022), 10, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/chinese-discourse-power-ambitions-and-reality-in-the-digital-domain/.
[21] Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Chase, Borrowing a Boat, 4.
[22] Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Chase, Borrowing a Boat, 9.
[23] Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Chase, Borrowing a Boat, v.
[24] Thibaut, Chinese Discourse Power, 7.
[25] Diresta et al, Telling China’s Story, 7.
[26] Ross Burley, Analysis of the Pro-China Propaganda Network Targeting International Narratives, (London, UK: Centre for Information Resilience, 2021), 4, 7, https://www.info-res.org/post/revealed-coordinated-attempt-to-push-pro-china-anti-western-narratives-on-social-media., 4,7.
[27] Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Chase, Borrowing a Boat, 27.
[28] Timberg and Harris, “Chinese Network of Fake Accounts Targets Trump.”
[29] Ibid.
[30] Diresta et al, Telling China’s Story, 44
[31] Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Chase, Borrowing a Boat, 94. See also Diresta et al, Telling China’s Story, 15.
[32] Diresta et al, Telling China’s Story, 20.
[33] Diresta et al, Telling China’s Story, 25
[34] Ibid.
[35] Fergus Ryan, Ariel Bogle, Albert Zhang and Dr Jacob Wallis, #StopXinjiang Rumors: The CCP’s decentralised disinformation campaign, (Barton, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2021), 6, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/stop-xinjiang-rumors.
[36] Jeff Kao and Mia Shuang Li, “How China Built a Twitter Propaganda Machine Then Let It Loose on Coronavirus,” ProPublica, March 26, 2020, https://www.propublica.org/article/how-china-built-a-twitter-propaganda-machine-then-let-it-loose-on-coronavirus.
[37] Jeff Kao, Raymond Zhong, Paul Mozur, and Aaron Krolik, “How China Spreads Its Propaganda Version of Life for Uyghurs,” ProPublica and New York Times, June 23, 2021, https://www.propublica.org/article/how-china-uses-youtube-and-twitter-to-spread-its-propaganda-version-of-life-for-uyghurs-in-xinjiang.
[38] Ryan et al, #StopXinjiang Rumors, 43
[39] Ryan et al, #StopXinjiang Rumors, 30
[40] Michael R. Pompeo, “Determination of the Secretary of State on Atrocities in Xinjiang,” Department of State, 2021, https://2017-2021.state.gov/determination-of-the-secretary-of-state-on-atrocities-in-xinjiang/index.html.
[41] Zhang et al, Strange Bedfellows, 6.
[42] Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato and Hsi-Ting Pai, Frontier influencers: The new face of China’s propaganda, Report No. 65/2022 (Barton, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2022), 6, 8, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/frontier-influencers.
[43] Ryan et al, Frontier Influencers, 25.
[44] Ryan et al, Frontier Influencers, 3-4
[45] Ryan et al, Frontier Influencers, 36
[46] Ryan et al, #StopXinjiang Rumors, 31
[47] Ryan et al, Frontier Influencers, 11
[48] Zhang et al, Strange Bedfellows, 15
[49] Ryan et al, Frontier Influencers, 33
[50] Ryan et al, Frontier Influencers, 31
[51] Ryan et al, Frontier Influencers, 41. See also Kao et al, “How China Spreads Its Propaganda Version of Life for Uyghurs.”
[52] Thomas Brown, “How China Is Influencing YouTubers into Posting State Propaganda,” Medium, November 16, 2021, https://medium.com/swlh/how-china-is-influencing-youtubers-into-posting-state-propaganda-db72acf18dfa.
[53] Paul Mozur, Raymond Zhong, and Aaron Krolik, “YouTube Influencers are Tools in Beijing’s Propaganda Blitz,” New York Times, December 14, 2021, https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/youtube-influencers-are-tools-beijings-propaganda/docview/2609572913/se-2.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Jason (@JasonLiving in China), “The Xinjiang THEY Don’t Want YOU to see…,” YouTube, March 17, 2023.
[57] Graphika, Ants in a Web, (Graphika: 2021), 3-4, https://graphika.com/reports/ants-in-a-web. See also Jeanne Whalen, Craig Timberg and Eva Dou, “Chinese businessman with links to Steve Bannon is driving force for a sprawling disinformation network, researchers say,” Washington Post, May 17, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/05/17/guo-wengui-disinformation-steve-bannon/.
[58] Dave Davies, “The Inscrutable Aims of Steve Bannon’s Enigmatic Chinese Benefactor,” NPR, October 20, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/10/20/1130184401/the-inscrutable-aims-of-steve-bannons-enigmatic-chinese-benefactor.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Graphika, Ants in a Web, 5-6
[61] Jonathan Swan and Erica Pandey, “Steve Bannon’s secret contract with a Chinese billionaire,” Axios, October 29, 2019, https://www.axios.com/2019/10/29/steve-bannon-contract-chinese-billionaire-guo-media.
[62] Graphika, Ants in a Web, 22
[63] Graphika, Ants in a Web, 24.
[64] Dan Friedman, ” Exclusive: Leaked Messages Reveal the Origins of the Most Vile Hunter Biden Smear,” Mother Jones, April 7, 2022, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/04/hunter-biden-laptop-guo-wengui-bannon-giuliani/.
[65] Korta, “Fake News,” 118
[66] Professor Brief to Eisenhower School Seminar on Operations in the Information Environment, “AI and Autonomy,” Stanford University, April 11, 2023.
[67] Nyla Husain, ” On Social Media, Sharing Mindset Makes People Worse at Judging Accuracy,” American Association for the Advancement of Science, August 6, 2021, https://www.aaas.org/news/social-media-sharing-mindset-makes-people-worse-judging-accuracy.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Diresta et al, Telling China’s Story, 41
[70] Lili Pike, “How China Uses Global Media to Spread Its Views—and Misinformation,” Grid News, May 18, 2022, 2.
[71] Diresta et al, Telling China’s Story, 9. See also Sarah Cook, “Beijing’s Global Megaphone: The Expansion of Chinese Communist Party Media Influence since 2017,” (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2020), 7, https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/beijings-global-megaphone.
[72] Thibaut, Chinese Discourse Power, 7
[73] Ryan et al, Frontier Influencers, 9
[74] Ryan et al, Frontier Influencers, 3
[75] Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Chase, Borrowing a Boat, 101
[76] Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Chase, Borrowing a Boat, 104
[77] Edward Wong, ” U.S. Fights Bioweapons Disinformation Pushed by Russia and China,” The New York Times, March 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/10/us/politics/russia-ukraine-china-bioweapons.html
[78] Elise Thomas, “QANON goes to China – via Russia,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Last Modified March 23, 2022, https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/qanon-goes-to-china-via-russia/.
[79] Department of State, Global Engagement Center, Brief to Eisenhower School Seminar on Operations in the Information Environment, March 17, 2023.
