Sub-objective 1: Strengthen Bilateral Relationships with the SCS Five. The DoS will lead the diplomatic efforts to conduct and manage bilateral relationships with each of the governments of the SCS Five. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) will provide trade support. The Department of Defense (DoD), USAID, and the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC) will support DoS diplomatic initiatives with expertise and offerings in their respective areas of operation. The support efforts would include membership in state delegations, trade, foreign aid, humanitarian support, Rule of Law, and other pertinent areas necessary to bolster U.S. goodwill. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Intelligence Community (IC) will provide the Intelligence and Information support required to facilitate successful diplomatic relations and international support. IC support mechanisms include human intelligence, signal intelligence, and cyber-intelligence that would give the U.S. an advantage. IC information support mechanisms include operations and sharing relationships that encourage the SCS Five to embrace and welcome close diplomatic, trade, and military relationships.
Sub-objective 2: Strengthen Multilateral Relations with ASEAN. The DoS will also lead the way in conducting and managing multilateral relationships with ASEAN and its member states. In addition to the support outlined in Sub-objective 1 above from the DoD, USAID, DFC, and IC, the office of the UN Ambassador will also support this multilateral diplomatic effort to facilitate successful diplomatic relations and international support.
Objective 2: Free The Sea. The U.S. will deter China’s illegal enforcement of unfounded claims without provoking military conflict and deny the fait accompli of coercing maritime concessions from the SCS Five.
Sub-objective 1: Deter Chinese Escalation and Deny Coercion Opportunities. The DoD will show U.S. commitment and might by maintaining its readiness and deployments supporting existing defense agreements. The U.S. counters China’s coercive use of its naval assets against the SCS Five and deters Chinese expansion by conducting routine freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the SCS. The U.S. also engages in military exercises with its partner nations. U.S. defense treaties with the Philippines and Thailand and the U.S. partnership with Australia justify U.S. military presence. There is no need to change this mode of operation, which serves as a deterrent to further Chinese expansion.
Sub-objective 2: Secure Information- and Cyber-Space. The IC and the U.S. Military will lead the efforts to secure the cyber domain. There will be an increased need for information operations to counter Chinese propaganda and misinformation regarding U.S. military activity, especially in advance of “Save the SEA” implementation operations. The U.S. must be wary to prevent portrayal as imperialistic, hidden agenda-driven opportunists to the SCS Five. The IC must upgrade cyber measures to prevent sabotage of “Free The Sea” and “Save the SEA” operations. The IC must proactively gather and process intelligence to stay ahead of hostile Chinese information and cyber-attacks well before the start of the “Save The SEA” operations. The information should be shared as needed with USAID, USTR, DoS, and the USACE to shape the development of technology and operational schemes for “Save the SEA” implementation, including working with local governments to tailor the information and messaging.
Objective 3: Save the SEA—NOAA’s ARC. The U.S. will develop and deploy coastal adaptation programs to the SCS Five.
Sub-objective 1: Develop Feasible Coastal Adaptation Measures for the SCS Five. NOAA will lead the ARC’s technological effort to ascertain SCS Five needs and facilitate the development of feasible coastal adaptation measures. The ARC will include the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the DFC, and the DoS. The USACE will provide technological and personnel support similar to the DoD support of NASA during the 1960s space program. The DFC will lead the mobilization and facilitation of U.S. private sector support. The DoS will leverage U.S. relationships with international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation to facilitate the internationalization of the support effort.
Sub-objective 2: Secure Agreements For Coastal Adaptation Support To The SCS Five. With USAID support, the DoS will lead the effort to provide aid to the SCS Five, offering coastal adaptation ARC support for areas bordering the SCS. As part of ARC efforts, the DFC and the DoS will facilitate the involvement of international organizations and the private sector to provide the infrastructure and workforce for the projects. The military will provide security, and the IC will provide intelligence and information support to facilitate the closing of the respective agreements.
Sub-objective 3: Manage And Execute SCS Five Coastal Adaptation Measures. USAID will oversee the projects, and NOAA will provide operational oversight over ARC construction of the coastal adaptation projects. As part of ARC efforts, the DFC and international partner organizations will facilitate the involvement of the public and private sectors, emphasizing using local talent for the respective projects to provide an ancillary economic benefit. USAID will also provide legal oversight support to American entities to prevent corruption and misuse of aid funding and resources. The DoD will adjust its ongoing operational effort to afford security as an ancillary benefit to the operating theater. The IC will provide information and intelligence support, including cyber support, to prevent sabotage from hostile actors. The DoS will provide diplomatic support for the effort by coalition-building with international partners and serving as the liaison between the U.S., the SCS Five, and ASEAN.
Constraints
There are several constraints: (i) Governmental: The U.S. Congress may not support or grant sufficient funding for the initiative, (ii) Domestic: the U.S. Congress or public may not support SEA-Merica 2040, (iii) International: Opponents may portray the U.S. as imperialistic, (iv) media-driven polarization: the initiative may be attacked from within and become a subject of political polarization. Support must be bi-partisan to be sustainable.
First, this diplomatic effort must have support from the Presidential level. As seen in the 2000 and 2016 elections, administration changes can stop diplomatic efforts in their tracks. DoS must conduct the diplomatic effort in a way that garners bipartisan support to ensure stability and sustainability. Information channels, including the media, must be utilized to shape and obtain the political and public support necessary to avoid the politicization of the diplomatic effort.
Second, China may exhibit a thin skin when viewing increased U.S. diplomatic activity and retaliate with a “Wolf Warrior” response to intimidate ASEAN member states and the SCS Five. China will also likely employ misinformation and aggressive cyber-campaigns to portray the U.S. as insincere, disingenuous, and imperialistic. Information and Intelligence actors must be proactive in shaping the narrative to mitigate Chinese misinformation. Diplomatic, Economic, and Financial actors can also have trade and financial alternatives ready for the SCS Five, which would blunt any Chinese threats and deter China from bullying a regional trade partner exclusively into the U.S. orbit.
SEA-Merica 2040 Costs, Benefits, and Risks
Costs
SEA-Merica 2040 leverages existing missions and funding in the diplomatic and military arena for “Treat Friends Like Family” and “Free The Sea.” But the research and development effort will require additional funding for the assessment, development, and deployment of the technological needs for “Save The SEA.”
“Save The SEA” requires further development of existing coastal adaptation technology into deployable projects permanently maintainable by the host nation.[45] The DoD and USACE will require funds and resources to assess each host nation’s needs adequately and thoroughly. The DFC will then require the resources to mobilize and involve the private sector in developing the necessary technology, including both “hard” and “soft” coastal adaptation measures to afford the versatility of courses of action. USAID will require increased resources and budget to manage the implementation and construction phase and afford proper oversight to guard against corruption. IC resources must prevent hostile cyber-attacks, sabotage, and misinformation campaigns.
Benefits
The benefits of SEA-Merica 2040 outweigh the costs. “Save the SEA” completes the foundation for a peaceful strategy to deny China dominance through coercion of the SCS Five. In the same way that the Marshall Plan cemented Europe’s confidence in the U.S., “Save the SEA” will engender SCS Five goodwill and trust in the commitment and resolve of the U.S. by showing concern for the future of Southeast Asia in the face of impending climate change losses. Presenting a sustainable option to stave off the effects of climate change preserves the economic viability of the SCS Five benefits the U.S. by stabilizing the region. “Save the SEA” denies China the opportunity to capitalize on climate change, hindering its domination of the SCS. The investment benefits are a stable, free, and open SCS, increased regional resilience, climate change advances, and enhanced U.S. international standing – benefits well worth the investment.
Risks To SEA-Merica 2040
There are three key risks to SEA-Merica 2040: (i) lack of U.S. political support, (ii) failure to develop adequate technology, and (iii) SCS Five rejection of U.S. overtures.
First, political polarization and xenophobia may generate political opposition to SEA-Merica 2040 initiatives. Save The SEA and NOAA’s ARC should be presented to the Bipartisan Senate Climate Solutions Caucus to forestall opposition. The Caucus, with an equal number of Republican and Democratic members, is dedicated to crafting and advancing bipartisan solutions to address climate change needs.[46] Tying in climate change with U.S. national security interests would help enhance congressional level support. A robust information campaign highlighting the importance of free and open seas to the targeted leaders and the American population mitigates this risk. So will the embedding of projects within programs and schemes already funded and not rising to the treaty level where Senate ratification is required.
Second, the technology for feasible, sustainable, deployable coastal adaptation packages may come slow or reach a dead end. A thorough assessment of each host nation’s customized needs mitigates this risk. Maximum leverage of the U.S. private sector (and international private sector via the International Finance Corporation) to conduct the research and development spreads the cost and internationalizes the effort.
Third, the SCS Five may be hesitant to accept U.S. coastal adaptation support. The appointment of NOAA as the lead agency accomplishes the demilitarization of the U.S. effort. The internationalization of ARC presents the SCS Five with a joint scientific initiative rather than a predatory capitalistic effort (unlike the Belt-Road Initiative). The story of Noah and the Ark transcends societies and religions.[47] Thus, the branding of the NOAA team as the “ARC” communicates to the SCS Five the purpose: to remediate flooding from rising sea levels. The messaging cultivates trust from host nations, leading to confidence in the sincerity and effectiveness of U.S. coastal adaptation measures.
Risks From SEA-Merica 2040
There are three key risks from SEA-Merica 2040: (i) provocation of China, (ii) sabotage, and (iii) corruption.
First, China may feel threatened by U.S. peaceful overtures that influence the balance of power and, in retaliation, may engage in provocative military and economic action. Robust intelligence and information initiatives that allow the U.S. to calculate its moves and counter Chinese propaganda, misinformation, or military escalation mitigate this risk. Having a civilian agency such as NOAA lead the coastal adaptation effort also quells notions of militarization.
Second, China or other hostile nations might engage in acts of sabotage, including cyber-attacks and other nefarious means. China may also engage in corruption efforts or flood the area with projects to compete with or wall out SEA-Merica 2040. IC escalation of information and intelligence efforts to stay ahead of China and counter any propaganda, cyber-attack, misinformation, corruption, or pre-emptive commercial campaigns mitigates this risk.
Third, the private sector employment in the host nations, where the Rule of Law differs from the U.S., may result in corruption or mismanagement of “Save The SEA” assets. Providing resources to USAID for Inspector General audits from the outset of planning and throughout the process mitigates this risk. Unfortunately, after the “Save The SEA” projects are complete, Inspector General efforts may be less effective since the projects revert to the management of the host country. But deferring to the host nation to manage its affairs is the price of sovereignty and avoiding the appearance of U.S. imperialism.
Counter-Arguments
SEA-Merica 2040 stands up to criticism and alternatives. The most significant criticism is that the strategy is too expensive. Alternatively, detractors may deem SEA-Merica 2040 inferior to a head-to-head trade or military clash. Both arguments fail.
SEA-Merica 2040’s Benefits Outweigh The Costs
Since “Treat Friends Like Family” and “Free The Sea” use existing diplomatic and military funding, the only additional expense is developing and deploying versatile and sustainable coastal adaptation technology. “Save The SEA” is consistent with current national strategies and goals because coastal adaptation mitigation is an existing need. Senator Marco Rubio, a member of the Bipartisan Senate Climate Solutions Caucus, acknowledged the rise of sea level as a measurable fact against which the U.S. must mitigate and adapt.[48] With congressional support and Save the SEA’s nesting within both U.S. national security and imminent environmental needs, obtaining bipartisan executive and legislative branch support is realistic and achievable.
Regarding funding NOAA’s ARC and USAID for assessment, management, and deployment of coastal adaptation assets, the investment directly results in valuable goodwill and confidence in the U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia. This goodwill translates to influence and economic development in the region, thus increasing trade potential, cementing regional security, and effectively combating climate change. Peacefully leveraging climate change to gain a free and open sea and long-term U.S. influence is well worth the investment.
SEA-Merica 2040 Is The Most Achievable Approach
Direct trade or military competition involves behavior modification as an aim. China’s interest in the SCS is well-ingrained into its society as a national goal. China’s political will is too strong—no matter who the leader is, China will no sooner bend in its will for SCS domination than it would with Taiwan. A head-to-head trade battle would be costly. China’s economy is too strong to starve out—the Cold War tactics used against the Soviet Union will not work. A military war is too costly and risky for the U.S. The American public is not receptive to war.
A peaceful focus on mitigating climate change is consistent with international moods and U.S. domestic concerns. Elimination of coastal flooding is a bipartisan issue, benefitting the U.S., partner nations, and even China. Like the Moon landing program, SEA-Merica 2040 can unite the world by proactively addressing coastal adaptation, with the U.S. taking the lead.
Conclusion
China’s excessive maritime claims in the SCS destabilize and undermine the balance of power in Southeast Asia. The best way to achieve a free and open SCS is a peaceful strategy that nests the common needs of the SCS Five within U.S. security interests and capabilities, all without requiring modification of Chinese behavior for success. SEA-Merica 2040 does the job.
