The overarching theme of these writers is not that the operational level lacks political factors but focuses on the political nature of war and the importance of the political context. Political warfare is not unique, it is simply an aspect of shaping the strategic context. The idea of an operational level, or levels at all, where politics is not present would be seen as simply absurd. The common thread that unites all of the writers is that they are steeped in a tradition of war that views it as a fundamentally political and social act. Unsurprisingly, the only strategic theorist mentioned by every single author is Clausewitz, although not all of them mention him favorably. Nevertheless, they all see political factors as pervasive, even for tactical decisions. As Donald Stoker has pointed out, it is this pervasiveness, the idea that “political goals affect every level of military activity,” that differentiates Clausewitz and the Clausewitzian tradition from others, not just the identification of war as a political act which was pointed out by other writers first.[6] It is this pervasive political and social context which makes mental and moral factors so important. Indeed, more important than material factors. It is also the aspect of Clausewitz most frequently ignored by Americans in and out of uniform. The Russians here do not ignore it and their focus on the political aspects of conflict is obvious throughout their works. It is also something they share with Bolshevik/Soviet writers, although the writers in this book give full vent to their disdain for them. The exceptions are Leer, who died before the rise of the Bolsheviks, and Lieutenant General Evgeny Ivanovich Martynov (1864-1937), who joined them and the Red Army, a service for which they rewarded him with summary execution in 1937. The mistaken belief in a new Russian “gray zone” way of war is not the result of Russian thinking, but of American ignorance of the subject.
It is ironic, then, that the modern Russian military could so seriously misjudge the political situation regarding Ukraine in 2022. The Kremlin launched an invasion of Ukraine on the presumption that Ukrainians would lack the political will to fight, the political leadership to do so effectively, and that NATO countries would lack the political unity to support them.[7] Three swings, three misses. The importance of a people’s will to fight, a theme of On War and the works in Strategiya, is directly applicable to the ongoing Russo-Ukraine War. Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian military believed that modern precision-guided and digital technology would diminish the importance of political will in war, the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. This idea seemed to be confirmed by the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and subsequent American operations in the 1990s where the Iraqi Army seemingly lost the will to fight in the face of American technological advantage. In reality, Saddam Hussein and similar regimes give their people no reason to fight, whatever the odds. And so Putin continues a disastrous conflict in Ukraine, unable to understand that a people’s will to fight is affected less by what they have to fight against and more by what they have to fight for.
The mistaken belief in a new Russian “gray zone” way of war is not the result of Russian thinking, but of American ignorance of the subject.
Both China and Russia believe modern technology will produce “non contact” or “contactless” warfare where adversaries sling ever more advanced missiles at each other without their maneuver or surface forces ever making contact to slug it out for territory and access.[8] Ironically, both point to the U.S. military as having proven the concept, although U.S. maneuver and surface forces are still the centerpiece of its doctrine. Would that modern Russia remembered this lost tradition of strategic thinking that focuses on mental and moral forces as more powerful and more important than technology, they may not have made the mistake of invading Ukraine in the first place.
The biggest downside to the book is its readability. Russian writing can be dense and stodgy at the best of times, and Russia in the late 19th and early 20th century was not the best of times. Of course, Fridman’s purpose here is not readability but resurrection. The works selected have long been inaccessible to non-Russian speakers and were chosen because of their influence among Russians, the applicability to modern Russian thinking and events, and, most importantly, to replace myths with facts. In that goal, the book certainly succeeds.
