Notes:
[1] Vitaly Shevchenko, “Little green men” or “Russian invaders”?” BBC, 11 March 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154.
[2] Arsalan Bilal, “Hybrid Warfare – New Threats, Complexity, and ‘Trust’ as the Antidote,” NATO Review, 30 November, 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/30/hybrid-warfare-new-threats-complexity-and-trust-as-the-antidote/index.html.; Michael Kofman, “Russian hybrid warfare and other dark arts,” War on the Rocks, March 11, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/.
[3] Greg Miller and Catherine Belton, “Russia’s spies misread Ukraine and misled Kremlin as war loomed,” Washington Post, August 19, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-fsb-intelligence-ukraine-war/; Olga Tokariuk, “A Year of Lies: Russia’s Information War Against Ukraine,” CEPA, February 21, 2023, https://cepa.org/article/a-year-of-lies-russias-information-war-against-ukraine/.
[4] Christoph Trebesch, Arianna Antezza, et. al, “The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?” (working paper, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany, February 2023); Paddy Hirsch, “Why sanctions against Russia aren’t working – yet,” NPR, December 6, 2022, https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2022/12/06/1140120485/why-the-sanctions-against-russia-arent-working-yet; Greg Miller, Souad Mekhennet, et. al, “In wake of Ukraine war, U.S. and allies are hunting down Russian spies,” Washington Post, February 17, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/17/russia-spies-europe-arrests/.
[5] Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva, and Jenny Oberholtzer, Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html, 6-20.
[6] Michael Koftman, et al., Lessons From Russia’s Operations, 33-48.
[7] Michael Kofman, et al., Lessons From Russia’s Operations, 44, 70.
[8] Brian Katz and Nicholas Harrington, “The Military Campaign,” in Moscow’s War in Syria, ed. Seth G. Jones, Washington, DC,: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Jones_MoscowsWarinSyria_WEB_update.pdf, 22.
[9] Jason Gresh, Seth G. Jones, and Edmund Loughran, “Implications and Takeaways,” in Moscow’s War in Syria, ed. Seth G. Jones, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Jones_MoscowsWarinSyria_WEB_update.pdf, 70; Seth Jones, “Russia’s Battlefield Success in Syria: Will it Be a Pyrrhic Victory?,” CTC Sentinel, vol 12, issue 9 (October 2019): 1-2, 5, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/russias-battlefield-success-syria-will-pyrrhic-victory/; Michael Weiss, “Syrian Rebels Backing Out of U.S. Fight Vs. ISIS,” Daily Beast, April 14, 2017, https://www.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-syrian-rebels-backing-out-of-us-fight-vs-isis.
[10] Seth G. Jones, “Russian Goals and Strategy,” in Moscow’s War in Syria, ed. Seth G. Jones, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Jones_MoscowsWarinSyria_WEB_update.pdf, 10-13; Brian Katz and Nicholas Harrington, “The Military Campaign,” 19; Seth Jones, “Russia’s Battlefield Success in Syria,” 3, 5.
[11] Brian Katz and Nicholas Harrington, “The Military Campaign,” 21-40; Jason Gresh, Seth G. Jones, and Edmund Loughran, “Implications and Takeaways,”66-67; Seth Jones, “Russia’s Battlefield Success in Syria,” 3, 5.
[12] Jason Gresh, Seth G. Jones, and Edmund Loughran, “Implications and Takeaways,” 68-69; Seth Jones, “Russia’s Battlefield Success in Syria,” 1.
[13] Tony Romm and Craig Timberg, “Facebook and Twitter testified before Congress. Conservative conspiracy theorists lurked behind them,” Washington Post, September 5, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/09/05/facebook-twitter-sandberg-dorsey-congress-tech-hearings/; Abigail Abrams, “ Here’s What We Know So Far About Russia’s 2016 Meddling,” Time Magazine, April 18, 2019, https://time.com/5565991/russia-influence-2016-election/.
[14] Philip Ewing, “Fact Check: Why Didn’t Obama Stop Russia’s Election Interference in 2016,” NPR, February 21, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/02/21/587614043/fact-check-why-didnt-obama-stop-russia-s-election-interference-in-2016.
[15] Reuters, “Factbox – Key quotes from Congress’ hearing on Russia and the U.S. election,” March 20, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-trump-russia-factbox-idAFKBN16R2J9.
[16] Michael Kofman, “Russian hybrid warfare and other dark arts,”
[17] CNBC, “U.S. intel accurately predicted Russia’s invasion plans. Did it matter?” February 25, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/25/us-intel-predicted-russias-invasion-plans-did-it-matter.html.
[18] Phil Mattingly, “Inside the Biden Administration’s monthslong effort to build a multi-country coalition to sanction Russia,” KDRV, February 26, 2022, https://www.kdrv.com/news/inside-the-biden-administrations-monthslong-effort-to-build-a-multi-country-coalition-to-sanction-russia/article_2c1c2921-4903-5402-b334-5f7a1c98f0bd.html; Greg Miller and Catherine Belton, “Russia’s spies misread Ukraine and misled Kremlin as war loomed”; Zach Dorman, “In new front of information war, U.S. repeatedly declassifies intelligence on Ukraine and Russia,” Yahoo!news, February 19, 2022, https://news.yahoo.com/in-new-front-of-information-war-us-repeatedly-declassifies-intelligence-on-ukraine-and-russia-224649617.html.
[19] White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 27, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
[20] Alexander Boroff, “What is great-power competition anyway?” Modern War Institute, April 17, 2020, https://mwi.usma.edu/great-power-competition-anyway/; Nathan Jennings, Amos Fox, and Adam Taliaferro, “The US Army is wrong on future war,” Modern War Institute, December 18, 2018, https://mwi.usma.edu/us-army-wrong-future-war/.
[21] Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Walting, Oleksandr V Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds, “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February-July 2022,” Royal United Services Institute, November 30, 2022, https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf, 10-12.
[22] Shannon Bond, “How Russia is losing – and winning – the information war in Ukraine,” NPR, February 28, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/02/28/1159712623/how-russia-is-losing-and-winning-the-information-war-in-ukraine; Christoph Trebesch, Arianna Antezza, et. al, “The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?”; Paddy Hirsch, “Why sanctions against Russia aren’t working – yet.”
[23] Phil Mattingly, “Inside the Biden Administration’s months long effort to build a multi-country coalition to sanction Russia.”
[24] “Jonathan Guyer, “NATO was in crises. Putin’s war machine made it even more powerful,” Vox, March 25, 2022, https://www.vox.com/22994826/nato-resurgence-biden-trip-putin-ukraine; Phelen Chatterjee, “Sweden and Finland’s journey from neutral to NATO, BBC, 29 June 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61397478.
[25] Greg Miller, Souad Mekhennet, et. al, “In wake of Ukraine war, U.S. and allies are hunting down Russian spies.”; Ben Lefebvre, “How American energy helped Europe best Putin, Politico, February 23, 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/23/american-energy-europe-putin-00083750; Steve Holland and Doina Chiacu, “US to help Moldova fight Russia’s destabilization efforts, Reuters, March 10, 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/23/american-energy-europe-putin-00083750.
[26] White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 27.
[27] Timothy Ash, “It’s Costing Peanuts for the US to Defeat Russia, CEPA, November 18, 2022, https://cepa.org/article/its-costing-peanuts-for-the-us-to-defeat-russia/.
